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DEATH SENTENCES: FINAL APPEALS FAIL 
Two appeals against death sentences have recently been 
rejected by President Suharto. In both cases, the convicted 
men were charged and found guilty of subversion. The 
details of the case, as far as it is known, are as follows: 
Trinsar Zubil was arrested in Medan, North Sumatra in 
January 1977 and tried for sabotage a year alter. He was 
accused of having sought to bring about the establishment 
of an Islamic state, and was alleged to have been involved in 
a number of incidents such as bomb attacks against a hotel, 
a church and a cinema in Medan in 1976. 
His request for clemency, submitted in March 1978, was 
eventually rejected on 14 December 1981 though he was 
not informed of the rejection till early February 1982. 
(Tempo W February 1982) 
Colonel Sudiono formerly of the Indonesian Air Force 
was arrested in the late nineteen-sixties on the grounds of 
involvement in the G30S. He was for some years a senior 
officer in the Air Force intelligence service and a close 
Associate of Air Commodore Omar Dhani. 
He was tried in 1972 and sentenced to death. Since then 
he has been awaiting a response to his appeal against the 
sentence. According to TAPOL records, there are altogether 
at least 60 persons who have been sentenced to death in 
connection with the G30S. 
News that Colonel Sudiono's appeal had been turned 
down was received from private channels and has not been 
reported in the Indonesian press. It was received shortly 
after many newspapers in Australia, the US and Western 
Europe reported that President Suharto had granted elem-
. ency to Dr Subandrio, former Deputy Prime Minister, and 
Air Commodore Omar Dhani (see T APOL Bulletin No 49, 
January 1982). 
More Clemency Pleas Pending 
TAPOL has also been informed that 16 other tried G30S 
prisoners are awaiting a decision by the President in 
response to appeals for clemency against death sentences. 
Imran Sentenced to Death 
Imran, the Muslim activist on trial for "masterminding" a 
hijack last year (see Buyung interview, p. 3) was sentenced 
to death on 13 March. 
OPPOSE THE DEA TH SENTENCE! 
On behalf of the Legal Aid Institution in Jakarta, the 
lawyer T. Mulya Lubis sent a cable to the President, 
in which he said: 
"In principle, the implementation of the death 
sentence is a step backwards in our efforts to 
uphold law and basic human rights." 
He urged the President to halt the execution of the 
death sentence in the case of Trinsar Zubil and to 
stop all further death sentences in the future. 
The Institute's director, Abdulrachman Saleh, has 
also spoken out against the execution of Trinsar 
Zubil. Although he is not opposed to the death 
sentence· as such, he strongly · opposes its use in 
political cases. 
TAPOL urges its readers and supporters to cable 
President Suharto (Istana Negara, · Jalan Veteran, · 
Jakarta) urging him to reverse his decisions and halt 
the executions of Trinar Zubil and Colonel Sudiono. 
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EDITORIALS 
TAPOL BULLETIN NO. SO 
This issue of TAPOL Bulletin is the 50th, hardly a time to 
celebrate , as our friends of the Dutch-Indonesian Commit-
tee remind us in a message. When the first Bulletin appeared 
in August 197 3, our energies were almost entirely concen-
trated on campaigning for the release of the 1965 political 
prisoners, the tapols, from whom we took our name. But 
already in early 1974, a new generation of political prison-
ers had our attention, the students arrested in connection 
with the demonstration protesting against the visit to lrido-
nesia of Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka. Then came the 
Indonesian invasion of East Timor in December 1975 and a 
whole new wave of killings, persecution and repression. 
Similar human rights violations were already being per-
petrated in West Papua , incorporated into the Indonesian 
Republic in 1963. 
The 1978 student movement which grew to a climax 
around the election of General Suharto to a third term as 
President produced a new crop of human rights victims, and 
dozens of political trials . 
The programme to release the long-term G30S prisoners 
was more or less completed by the end of 1979, but, as we 
know, the released prisoners confront major problems in 
returning to normal life because of the severe restrictions 
imposed on their rivil rights. Many 1965 tapols remain in 
prison serving long prison sentences or facing the prospect 
of execution if the 60 or so death sentences are upheld. 
But just as these releases were taking place, as Buyung 
Nasution so cogently reminds us in an interview published 
in this issue, hundreds if not thousands of Muslim activists 
were being detained as part of the systematic intimidation 
of the Muslim community. Buyung's plea on their behalf, 
urging TAPOL to take up their cases more vigorously, only 
underlines the need to work on a much more complex 
variety of problems . 
We value the constant support of our readers, and your 
generous and encouraging response to our recent appeal for 
financial assistance. We can only say at this juncture that, 
conditions permitting, TAPOL will remain in existence and 
T APOL Bulletin will continue to appear for just as long as 
there is a need for us and it. 
UNRESTRICTED ACCESS TO EAST TIMOR 
The controversy in the press over food shortages in East 
· Timor should not be allowed to distract from the large-
scale violation of human rights there. Catholic priests work-
ing there report that the food situation is extremely serious. 
Mr. Whitlam, who visted E. Tim or recently with an Austral-
ian journalist, has denied this and has maliciously attacked 
the priest who sent out the reports. 
It is virtually impossible for any independent witnesses 
to go to E. Tim or. Journalists, representatives of aid 
agencies and foreign visitors have all been refused entry 
permits. Foreigners even require a special permit to go to 
West Timor and their movements are closely supervised. 
Even those carefully selected to visit E. Timor do not have 
access to all the information; they are treated to stage-
managed official programmes. 
It is perfectly clear that the Indonesians have a great deal 
to hide, not only about the food situation and the treat-
ment of political prisoners but also about the extent of 
resistance to its occupation. It is essential to press for un-
restricted access into East Timor for independent observers 
so that a proper picture of the situation can be obtained. 
MESSAGES ON THE OCCASION OF THE 50th ISSUE OF TAPOL BULLETIN 
The 50th issue of T APOL Bulletin is not really something 
to celebrate. But it does show your determination never to 
give up. 
We are sure you will continue with your inspiring work, 
especially with TAPOL Bulletin which is of utmost import-
ance for everyone who wants to know what is really going 
on in Indonesia. In solidarity, 
KOMITEE INDONESIE 
Amsterdam-Nederland. 
I see the TAPOL Bulletin as a fascinating pacemaker in the 
international politics of human rights, a kind of trans-
national counterpart of America's I. F. Stone's Weekly. 
Though often disagreeing with what the Bulletin has said 
in its editorial statements, I have consistently admired the 
imagination with which its staff have sought after facts and 
the scrupulous way in which they have presented them, 
whatever their source. Careful, precise vigilance journalism 
of this type is making an important contribution to the new 
morality of human rights that is now emerging, one that 




Congratulations to TAPOL for translating and publish-
ing (September 1981 Bulletin) the Report from the Pro-
vincial Assembly of East Timor, which details "from the 
horse's mouth" the atrocities the Timorese people are 
suffering at the hands of the Indonesian military forces. 
Your work has most certainly helped bring the issue of East 
Timor to the attention of the world's press again. 
It was especially ironic to read the article in the Far 
Eastern Economic Review, "Jakarta's Can of Worms" (1 
January 1982) which acknowledges TAPOL's work on this 
question and quotes extensively from your translation. It is 
not so long since Derek Davies used FEERin an attempt to 
discredit and break up TAPOL. 
With best wishes, 
Elizabeth Marlow. 
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BUYUNG NASUTION INTERVIEWED BY TAPOL 
Adna Buyung Nasution* the human rights lawyer who set up the first Legal Aid Institute in Jakarta over ten years ago, 
was inteniiewed by Carmel Budiardjo of TAPOL in Holland on 12 March 1982. 
I think at this time, the Muslims can be said to represent 
one of the major political challenges to the government. 
What different forms of political repression does the 
Suharto government employ to intimidate and suppress 
Muslim activists? 
Before I answer that question, I would like to express my 
appreciation for this question of yours because in the past I 
have criticised TAPOL as well as Amnesty for not raising 
your voices on behalf of other political prisoners in Indo-
nesia. What I have noticed in the past is that you only cared 
for communist political prisoners. That gave a bad 
impression of T APOL as well as of Amnesty. But this 
question of yours is a good sign because it really means that 
you care for other political prisoners in Indonesia, because 
it means that you will stick to the struggle for human 
rights as a fundamental and basic thing. 
And now to your question: it is very obvious that after 
the release of the so-called communist political prisoners, 
the regime in Indonesia turned its attention towards the 
Muslims, in the sense that many were arrested and became 
political · prisoners. They were arrested on the basis of 
several accusations-not charges, accusations which means 
that there is no legal case, no court case. The first were the 
well-known Komando Jihad cases, hundreds of them were 
arrested in the years 1977, 1978, and 1979. One of the 
main defendants was Ismael Pranoto, who was.sentenced to 
death in East Java. The second case was the so-called 
"Warman Gang". And now there is the case of Imran. All of 
them are regarded as Muslim fundamentalists and extrem-
ists. 
But what happened is this: in the case of Ismael Pranoto , 
we got data from evidence at the court hearing showing 
that the Pranoto case was a frame-up, that it was started by 
intelligence agents who made contact with people of the 
former Darul Islam in West Java. They were approached by 
intelligence agents and invited to do something to protect 
the motherland. The intelligence people told them that the 
motherland was in danger because of the communist threat 
from Vietnam. If they were really loyal to the country, real 
patriots, they should do something to protect the country. 
~elieving this story, these Muslims felt obliged to do some-
thing. They agreed to build up Muslim power for use by 
the government against this communist threat from Viet-
nam. That was the frame-up. So they organised themselves, 
these youngsters from West Java, Central Java and East 
Java. Of course they didn ' t know the background , they 
only believed that this was a lawful movement with support 
from top intelligence people . They all participated. But 
then , all of a sudden, they were cut off. 
After that , there was the case of Warman , which is still 
a mystery because he was never arrested , never brought to 
court. He was murdered in a fight about a year ago. 
And now there is the latest case which is still before the 
court, the Imran case . This too is a case that makes the 
Muslim people really angry. They believe this case is also a 
frame-up, because right from the beginning, when lmran 
started his movement, the "Islam Ja 'maah ", he made 
speeches, gave sermons in the mosque containing very open, 
blunt statements against the government , against the 
constitution, against the Pancasila. This was certainly 
known to the intelligence community. But no action was 
taken against him. On the contrary , he was given facilities. 
When Muslims heard that he had connections or liaisons 
with intelligence agents they became suspicious of his 
movement. He was behaving so daringly, and openly criti-
cised or attacked the constitution, the Pancasila and even 
*Buyung Nasution was an activist .in KASI, the United Action Front of Intellectuals set up in late 1965. This was one of the organisations 
which supported the establishment of the New Order. He was appointed by Suharto as a member of Parliament and the Peoples' Consultative 
Assembly in 1966, after both bodies had been purged of PKI and leftwing members. With a few others, he campaigned actively for the 
restoration of constitutional government and pressed for the repeal of the 1963 Anti-Subversion Presidential Decree. Although a decision to 
that effect was adopted by the Consultative Assembly, the Presidential Decree was in fact enacted as a law. 
In 1968, Buyung was dismissed from the two legislative bodies and has since then continued to oppose unconstitutionality in the New 
Order. He has repeatedly called for the dissolution of KOPKAMTIB. In 1974 he was arrested during the crackdown on the student move-
ment and its supporters; he spent nearly two years in detention without trial. 
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Suharto . Why didn 't the governm ent take action while 
other Muslims who didn't dare to say such things were 
being arrested? 
It was only after the hijacking case in Bangkok that he 
was arrested. The government accused him of being the 
man behind the scenes, the actor intellectualis. We sent our 
lawyers to defend him in cou rt but I have to admit tha t it is 
not an easy thing because not all the facts can be exposed 
and presented in court. Many principal witnesses cannot be 
brought to the trial - have not been caught - and cannot 
appear in court. The authorities refused to do so, giving 
many reasons , of course. 
These were witnesses called by the. defence? 
Yes. For example , the co-pilot of the aircraft. He is still 
alive , although the pilot was killed . The stewardesses, the 
air crew, some of the passengers, were all "not available". 
Also one important man who we believe was a go-between, 
between Imran and the intelligence was killed too. He was 
murdered. So. many facts remain undisclosed. 
I notice in a press clipping I've just received that Imran's 
defence lawyers were asking a lot of questions about the 5 
hijackers who were killed. For example: were they all killed 
at the time the plane was stormed, why was there no post 
mortem, and where were they buried? 
Yes, that's quite true . One of the five men, according to the 
information we received at the time, was not killed; he was 
alive when he was taken from Bangkok to Jakarta. So if the 
government said later on that all of them were killed, it 
means that the fifth person was killed in Jakarta, not Bang-
kok. And that has been confirmed by reports from many 
foreign reporters . 
The arrests of Muslims are still going on. J don't know 
how many Muslims are now under arrest, how many 
Muslim political detainees there are. I think nobody knows 
the exact number because it is changing all the time. 
Especially in Jakarta, in the last few months, many Muslim 
leaders or executives of mosques have been arrested for 
several days, just for a short time, one after the other. It's 
a very effective way to crack them mentally. 
Are they , generally speaking, activists of the PPP or the 
NU? 
No, not necessarily. They are just people on mosque com-
mittees, people who take care of the mosques. They are not 
politically-orientated people, they are just good, concerned 
Muslims. 
In the past we in T APOL became very familiar with the 
pro-PKI organisations. We knew about Burn, the so-called 
'final solution' . We had a fairly comprehensive picture of 
the whole system of repression against what we could 
perhaps call the 'old left'. But I haven't in my own mind 
yet been able to obtain an overall picture of the repression 
of · Muslims. Is the repression less systematic than it was 
towards the PKI and the so-called G30S prisoners? 
Of course what you say is right. You got a clearer picture 
about the repression of communists because it happened 
over a long period of time, and you had enough time to 
study and observe the system. The detention of Muslims 
has been happening only since fairly recently. But I expect 
you to make as many efforts as you did for the communists, 
to make a study of it , and to do something about these 
political prisoners. 
I would say the system is almost the same because the 
government is using the same security apparatus to arrest 
and detain these Muslim people. At the top is KOPKAM-
TIB, the Satgas Intel Pusat (Central Intelligence Special 
Squad), and in the regions where the regional military 
commands are, there are the LAKSUSDA, the special 
officers of KOPKAMTIB. They take action in almost the 
same way as they did towards the communist political 
prisoners in the past. They do it in the framework of what 
they call "intelligence operations". There is no law what-
soever, no legal procedure whatsoever. They arrest these 
people without any legal warrants, then they take them to 
a place without letting the family know where. And they 
are being detained in the same places where former tapols 
were held. And more than that, the same group of people 
who used to beat and torture these communist prisoners 
are now being used against the Muslim political prisoners. 
This is what really shocks me. When I was released from 
prison in 1976 I went to see Sudomo, the chief of KOP-
KAMTIB, and asked him to get rid of all the people who 
used to interrogate, torture and beat those prisoners 
because in my eyes they are not human beings, they are like 
animals, they have no conscience. It is dangerous for any-
body to have people like that in power in such places. They 
must be sacked! If you still need people to work in 
KOPKAMTIB (you know of course that 1 am very much 
against KOPKAMTIB which in my opinion should be 
abolished; I have believed this firmly since 1968-69)- how-
ever, if they want to keep KOPKAMTIB, they must at least 
replace these people . What I have found in the case of the 
Muslim prisoners is that these really inhuman people, the 
people who are like animals, are still working on the Muslim 
political prisoners. 
whole system of repression. You were criticising us for Do you feel there is any purpose to be served in publicising 
concentrating almost entirely on the communist prisoners. the names of people who do the torturing and beating? I 
It's not entirely true because we have tried to work for ask the question because just a few weeks ago I received a 
Malari prisoners. We publicised your case when you were in report about the torture of an Achehnese prisoner and it 
prison, and so on. But certainly when T APOL came into mentioned the names of soldiers who did the torturing. I 
existence, repre~ion of communists was the main problem can't give you the names now as I don't have the report 
of human rights abuse in Indonesia. We became very with me, but one of the places mentioned was a jail in Jalan 
familiar with the whole system of repression ; the dismissals, Gandhi, Medan. 
the long term detention without trial. We knew about the That was a year ago, it's not a recent case. But that does 
organisations that had been banned and the kind of accusa- not mean that they have stopped it. It was exposed by a 
tions that were being made against these people, against the member of PERADIN, Sjarif Siregar, the chairman of the 
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Buyung Nasution with another human rights lawyer Yap Thiam Hien, signing an agreement in Manila to set up a South East Asia Human 
Rights Council. The Council, which also includes lawyers from the Philippines, Thailand and Malaysia, was established in February 1982. It 
aims to monitor human rights violations in the countries of the region. 
Mr Yiap Thiam Hien is Secretary of the Indonesian Institute for the Defence of Basic Human Rights. 
advocates' association in Medan. 
The document I have here is about Medan, but it did not 
come direct from Medan. It is based on a report from an 
Achehnese who is now a refugee in Sweden. He got out of 
Acheh a few months ago and has described what happened 
to him in Jalan Gandhi. It is true it happened a few years 
ago but it is not from the source you mention. He gives the 
names of many of his torturers. 
What I heard about at the time was that the army arrested 
people in North Sumatra and then beat them badly , in a 
cruel and inhuman way. As a result, a member of PERA-
DIN raised his voice in protest but he was almost arrested 
by the military authorities. He came to Jakarta for pro-
tection, and we helped him . After that, there was no-one in 
North Sumatra to publish anything more about those cases. 
But I believe the practice is still going on. So I would 
confirm any information about that kind of treatment in 
Jalan Gandhi. 
there, naked. They are made to keep their faces below the 
water for long periods of time. 
I would say that if those people whom I would describe 
as animals still exist and are still in function, then things 
like that cannot be avoided. They will do them again and 
again because they are accustomed to handing out that kind 
of treatment. And they are animals who get enjoyment 
from the suffering of others. 
You have mentioned the work done by the LBH in 
defending Muslim cases. What other work does the LBH do 
for the Muslim prisoners, for those who don't come to 
trial? 
To be honest , we cannot do much, just like with the 
communist tapols in the past. What we can do, firstly, is to 
receive the families who come to us to report or to com-
plain. This may seem to be a very small thing but, in my 
experience, it is something these people need; they need to 
have someone to whom they can speak openly, with con-
fidence, about their problems. In this way they can share 
We received information, again from the same person, their grievances. Secondly, to find out where the detainees 
about a secret water-room under the stage. The prison is a are being held, because the families generally are left com-
former school, and under the stage in the school theatre, pletely in the dark. They don't know who arrested their 
there is a small room, without windows, with just a small father, husband or son because the people who came to 
hole leading in. The prisoners are forced down this hole. arrest them didn't leave any documents. I remember one 
This room is filled several feet high with water, and the day somebody came to the LBH, a woman with 7 children. 
water is full of larvae, leeches and dangerous insects. The This was 7 or 8 years ago, her husband was a tapol, he had 
prisoners have to stand in this water for hours on end. been a station master in West Java. She came crying, and 
According to our information, most of the prisoners reported that her husband had been taken in the middle of 
forced to suffer this treatment either go mad or die. the night without any documents. When I asked who came 
Yes, I've heard about that. The prisoners have to swim to take him away, she said she did not know because all she 
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saw was that they were wearing uniforms, and came in a 
jeep. So I asked her what she did then, she said she went to 
the police station, the army headquarters, to all the local 
authorities , but nobody knew anything. She was totally in 
the dark. It took us almost a month to find out where he 
was. And when we discovered this, it was really great for 
her because she knew that her husband was still alive, and 
knew where he was. 
It's the same now with these Muslim detainees. Many 
people came to us. I remember a few months ago, a father 
came to us informing us that his son was arrested about 3 
or 4 o'clock in the morning, without any warrant. So we 
made enquiries and after a week, we found out that he had 
been arrested by a LAKSUSDA. So my deputy went to see 
the commander in charge. In the beginning he said: "We 
don't know anything about him." Many ways and tricks 
are used to evade our enquiries. But because my deputy 
was very persistent and pressed hard, in the end they 
admitted that this man was in their hands. But this took 
almost a month. He fought for days and weeks. So when we 
asked what the charge was, what the reason for the arrest 
was, on the basis of which law, they said it was "beyond 
the law". They used these words quite specifically to my 
deputy: "This is beyond the law". It was still at the pra-
judicial stage . He was arrested for security reasons, and he 
was also being interrogated for security reasons. 
This is something very striking in Indonesia : in practice, 
this is a new development. Intelligence authorities in Indo-
nesia arrest people, detain people , and interrogate people 
not on the basis of law and not for justice - the term we 
normally use is pro-justitia- but for what they call pra 
justitia, before the judicial procedures. This is something 
not only new but something never known in legal science, 
in law in any normal country. Only Indonesia has this 
practice. I say there is no law for such practices because 
indeed there is no law for security people to arrest, detain 
and interrogate people. 
The new Criminal Procedure Code (HAP) hasn't made any 
difference, has it? 
No. 
I'm not sure that it made any difference in the area of 
criminal justice, has it? 
Well, it should of course, but let's wait and see. I don't 
know yet. We have to observe the practice. But certainly 
with the compromise in the last article of the new law, 
which says that this new law on criminal procedure does 
not apply to cases coming under "special procedures" ,.such 
as those coming under the anti-subversion act, it means that 
it has nothing to do with these security cases. 
I notice that in the case of the G30S prisoners, there was no 
question about it: they were detained indefinitely. But 
when the Malari people were arrested, induding yourself, 
the authorities, at the end of the first year (at the time of a 
visit to Indonesia by a Dutch parliamentary mission) made 
quite a lot of efforts to prove that they were keeping within 
welJ the one year is up, but they are being re-arrested, or 
they didn't even release them, but prolonged their deten-
tion for another year. Do they do that now with the 
Muslim prisoners? Do they keep within this one-year limit, 
or do they just ignore it? 
Well, to be honest, we need to check this. The problem is. 
that these people are held so secretly. I would say this is 
more secret than the arrest of the G30S tapols. They still 
remain in intelligence hands by contrast with the tapols. 
The ta pols were arrested-certainly, in 1965, 1966 and 
1967 they were kept in the hands of intelligence for inter-
rogation-but after that they were turned over to the 
military police. But the Muslims are, up to today, still in 
the hands of the intelligence people. 
So do you mean that they remain at that stage until-if 
they are going to be tried-they actually go for trial? 
Not necessarily, until they are tried. I shall try to describe 
the stages. The first is the intelligence operation stage. If 
they have finished with the intelligence operations, the 
prisoners are transferred to the military police, for further 
interrogations to prepare the case for the 'pro-justitia' stage. 
That is the task of the military police or the prosecution 
office, or the normal police. Sometimes it is a combination 
of all three. But this doesn't happen with the Muslim 
prisoners. They remain in the hands of the intelligence 
people. 
And even at that stage they are being held in prisons? 
Yes. 
In the case of the G30S prisoners they, or I should say we, 
were usually held in transit camps and we only went to 
prison after our longterm detention status had been deter-
mined. Do you mean that Muslim prisoners already in 
prison are sti11 at the intelligence interrogation stage? 
Yes. You see, in the communist case, there were three 
stages: the first was the operational stage in the hands of 
the intelligence, then they were transferred to the. military 
police as detainees, pending a court trial. Then when they 
were almost ready for trial, they were again transferred, this 
time to the hands of the prosecution. And it was at this 
stage that the prosecution issued formal arrest documents, 
so that the prisoner could be accounted for later on. 
Do you see any signs of longterm labour camps being set up 
for Muslim prisoners such as . those set up for the G30S 
prisoners? 
This could happen if the situation gets worse. If the resis-
tance against the regime gets stronger, I bet they .will do 
that. 
But you don't see any signs of that happening at the 
moment? 
No. They are only arrested, then detained in many places in 
North Sumatra, Central and South Sumatra, West, Central 
and East Java and Lombok, the most easterly place. 
the terms of the anti-subversion law which only allows What do you think are the most effective ways of cam-
detention without trial or charge for one year. So they said, paigning internationally against this particular kind of 
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repression? Should we concentrate on special areas or 
countries? Have you any ideas about strategy? 
Well, you know more about that than I do. I would say you 
should get the names of these· people and make them 
known to the public, internationally. By publicising their 
names, you are better able to exert pressure on the regime. 
One thing I have learnt about this regime, and I think this is 
the character of regimes like this all over the world, is that 
if nobody pays attention, if nobody cares about what they 
do, arresting and detaining people, they just go on doing 
these things. 
Do you have any impression that any Muslim groups in 
Indonesia, say the PPP or any other groups, have made 
efforts to help these prisoners, compaigning for them or 
making international contacts on their behalf! 
I know that some Muslim groups really work hard to help 
them, by supporting the families, looking after them, then 
contacting the LBH, and giving us information for us to use 
when necessary. So there are indeed Muslims working with 
us. 
Have they made any approaches to international bodies? 
No, I don't think so because they lack communication with 
the outside world. If they had any, it would be with 
countries in the Middle East. But I don't think they have 
such ideas. In this sense, I would say Muslim groups are 
weak in their communications. Sometimes I can't under-
stand this. Why are they so weak? They depend so much on 
us, on the LBH, in many ways. 
Do you think we in T APOL, or Amnesty International 
should concentrate on certain types of organisations, such 
as Muslim organisations, which might take up these cases? 
Well, it's logical but I wouldn't recommend it, because it 
might give another weapon to the government who might 
say these Muslims are really linked with the Pan-Islamic 
movement. 
Now about the campaign to abolish the death sentence 
which was launched last year by the LBH. I understand that 
it became difficult to expand the campaign because the 
Muslim community in particular was against the campaign. 
I notice now that several Muslim prisoners have been 
·sentenced to death. Do you think this might affect opinion 
in the Muslim community? Might they now be more 
attracted to the idea of abolishing the death sentence? 
I can't be sure but I think that it's more favourable now to 
campaign on this issue. It's important to understand that 
we failed at the time to continue our campaign after some 
initial success because the climate was still rather tense ; it 
was just after a long period of antagonism between Muslims 
and Christians, a time when there was still some suspicion 
between them. Secondly, there is indeed a dogmatic view 
among some Muslims because capital punishment is 
jusified by the Holy Koran. For these two reasons perhaps, 
the Muslim community objected to the idea of abolishing 
the death sentence. But now with more death sentences 
against Muslims, their opinion may change. The climate 
may now be more favourable. 
We heard recently that an appeal for clemency made by 
Colonel Sudiono, a G30S prisoner now under death sen-
tence has been rejected by the President. There are many 
G30S prisoners under sentence of death. T APOL has been 
told that sixteen of them are now waiting for replies to 
their appeals for clemency. I also read in Tempo that 
Trinsar Zubil, a Muslim prisoner has lost his appeal against 
the death sentence. ls it good to campaign against all these 
death sentences together? 
Yes, I think so because in that way, we don't make any 
distinction. It shows that we are being more fundamental 
in our approach. 
The disturbing thing about the G30S prisoners is that their 
death sentences were passed down ten years ago and in 
some cases even longer, 12 years or more, yet they still have 
no reply to their appeals for clemency. 
That is very cruel indeed. It's something that I mentioned 
in an interview with a Dutch newspaper in 1976. Leaving 
people that long to wait for a decision is another form of 
cruelty. I really think that we have to start again from the 
beginning to organise a campaign against the death penalty, 
bearing in mind that so many people are awaiting decisions 
and the fact that the two you already mentioned have been 
turned down. I bet that the others will follow. If they have 
rejected clemency for these two people, it is likely the 
government will also refuse the others. 
A problem for T APOL about the campaign against the 
death sentence is that when it was launched-and we read 
quite a lot about it in the Indonesian press-we found 
absolutely no reference to the many death sentences passed 
against people tried in connection with the G30S. We have 
records of about 60 people under sentence of death. As far 
as I know, five of these sentences have already been carried 
out. Were these cases excluded from the campaign for 
tacitical reasons? 
There was certainly no intention to forget or disregard the 
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sentences passed against these tapols. But the point is this : 
we started the campaign by using the momentum of the 
issue at the time , the impending execution of Kusni Kasdut , 
a convicted murderer. It was a time when the press, 
especially Kompas. was very anxious to help Kusni Kasdut. 
But the death sentences against those 60 people , even if 
we had heard about them then , weren 't known to people in 
general , so it would have been difficult to start a campaign 
about them . So, ifs really a question of timing- that we 
started the campaign at the time of Kusni's execution. 
Now I have a question about the four members of the East 
Timor Regional Assembly (DPRD) who were arrested last 
year. We got the impression that when the DPRD report 
was presented to the government in August 1981, it looked 
as though it was going to be ignored. It was only after the 
document they had prepared and submitted to the govern-
ment was published outside Indonesia, in Holland, in 
Britain, in Australia and elsewhere, that the government 
began to get very angry about it, and that was when the 
four DPRD members were arrested in Bali. So it was 
because of the international attention given to that docu-
ment. Then, there was a lot of international publicity, 
particularly in Australia, about the four arrests. Do you 
think the international publicity about the arrests was 
important in securing their release, because they were 
released very quickly, weren't they? 
Yes, it was very , very important. You put it very correctly. 
That without being publicly known, domestically or more 
important internationally, this case would never have come 
to the surface, and the four men would not have been 
released, or it would have taken much longer to get their 
release. And I think it was very effective to publish that 
report . 
I can say that, as we have seen so far , this regime is very 
sensitive to publicity or public opinion abroad , so we must 
make use of this to protect human rights in Indonesia. I am 
•Very convinced about this. 
I'm very interested to hear you say this because very often 
peo~le say . to us : those people don't care, it's no use, 
you re making a lot of fuss about nothing. I personally 
don't believe that. I wouldn't be doing what I do if I 
believed that. 
I don't believe that either. I have said many times : it is 
wrong to accept the advice of many people in authority 
who say : "Don't interfere, don't publish the names of 
people, or don't make any efforts because it will only harm 
the people in prison." That's all bluff. We should not accept 
such misleading advice. When I was released from my own 
imprisonment , I checked with some friends outside who 
told me they didn't do anything for me because they had 
been given advice from Indonesian friends and from people 
in authority who said : "Don't publish anything about 
Buyung because it will harm him ." I think that's wrong. I 
would always advise people to do everything they can to 
let the government know that there are many eyes watching 
what they are doing. It is very important. 
decisive difference to what we can do. The LBH didn't 
exist , not at any rate for outward consumption, when 
T APOL first came into existence, and we had to work with 
very few contacts with Indonesia. I'm very grateful to have 
had this opportunity to meet you and do this interview 
because I hope it is going to bring a new period of coopera-
tion between us. We really need people in Indonesia who 
understand what we are trying to do, and also understand 
our limitations because, you know we are very limited in 
what we can do. We need the help of people in Indonesia 
to provide us with information because we can't do 
anything without information from Indonesia. 
I think that the four DPRD members have all been 
released. Are they now back in Dili? And functioning 
again? 
Yes, they're all back in Dili. It's not so clear whether they 
are still functioning as DPRD members. I imagine, knowing 
the situation there, that even though they are back in their 
old functions ,' they cannot function as effectively as before. 
That's understandable because once you have been arrested, 
then released , it takes time for people to function normally 
again. I think they must still be in a cornered or awkward 
position , under pressure. 
Do you know anything about how the DPRD members in 
East Timor were appointed? They were appointed from 
above, weren't they? 
Yes, that may be, but nevertheless, within the reality of the 
political constellation in East Timar, there still are leaders 
of the East Timorese people besides those in the jungle. The 
fact that they are still there to act and speak up on behalf 
of the people means that they are worthy to be members of 
the DPRD, in spite of the procedure used to appoint them. 
I'd like to ask you about disappearances in Indonesia. Have 
you for example heard about any Muslim prisoners who 
have disappeared? 
This is a new problem for us, new in the sense that we just 
realise now that such cases should be documented and 
campaigned about. I don't mean that disappearances are. a 
new thing for Indonesia. As I think more about this, I 
realise that disappearances have been going on in Indonesia 
for many years, since the beginning of the Republic. For 
example, Otto Iskandardinata of West Java disappeared at 
th_e ~eginning of the Republic. He had been appointed First 
Mimster. The!1, there was Tan Malaka, then Amir Sjari-
fuddin who also disappeared . 
We have just started monitoring disappearances in the 
past few months. We are still looking for ways to monitor 
them because it is not easy to make enquiries about such 
things. Normally the families who have suffered disappear-
ances are more scared than other people ; they are really 
under stress. 
I know of one G30S prisoner who was released in June last 
year. Early in her detention, she was interrogated with great 
brutality. Then, because she was refusing to speak, her 8-
year-old daughter was tortured and beaten in front of her in 
order to make her speak. Then because neither the daughter 
nor the mother would speak, the soldiers threatened to take 
I m~st _say that we in T APOL. have watched with great the daughter away. And that's what they did. Until now, 
admiration what you have done m the LBH. It has made a she has not been re-united with her daughter. 
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LAWYERS SPEAK OUT AGAINST 
MILITARY INTIMIDATION--
Ex-Tapols Fully Entitled to Protection of the Law. 
The director of the Legal Aid Institute (LBH) has strongly 
criticised civil and military officials in East Java for taking 
action against a lawyer who agreed to defend the interests 
of a group of peasants in the district of Kediri. 
The lawyer, Franz Gunawan, was summoned by the 
district-head of Kediri last September and "handed over" 
to the East Java military command on the grounds that he 
was "helping PKI elements who were under reporting re-
quirements" (see TAPOL Bulletin No. 48, November 1981 ). 
The LBH Director, Abdulrachman Saleh said (Sinar 
Harapan, 6 October 1981) that it was quite wrong to raise 
questions about who makes an allegation or initiates legal 
proceedings. Even though the plaintiffs are ex-tapols, they 
are still Indonesian citizens and entitled to the protection 
of the law, he said. As to the truth of the accusation, it is 
for the courts to decide, not the district-head of Kediri or 
the military commander LAKSUSDA. 
The Chairman of the Indonesian Association of lawyers 
(PERADIN) has also complained about the treatment of 
Gunawan. "Any citizen is allowed to bring law suits regard-
less of his/her political beliefs", he said. By summoning and 
interrogating Gunawan regarding his relationship with his 
clients, the district-head and the security officer were acting 
illegally because this contravenes the lawyers' professional 
code of secrecy (Sinar Harapan, 6 October 1981 ). 
Lawyers representing the law association in East Java 
have also raised the Gunawan case. Two lawyers in 
Surabaya, Pamudji and Martono lsworo, both said that they 
Continued from opposite page 
had on a number of occasions acted on behalf of people 
regarded as "ex-G30S/PKI" and had not been subjected to 
pressure either from the civil or the military authorities. 
In reply to a query addressed to the district-head of 
Kediri, the East Java branch of PERADIN has been told 
that Gunawan's case involved "provocative actions" in 
Kediri, namely helping people over land disputes where the 
people concerned were required to report to the authorities 
regularly (walap) because of their alleged involvement in 
the banned communist party (Sinar Harapan, 9 October 
1981 ). 
"Latent Communist Threat" 
An earlier news report about Gunawan has just reached 
TAPOL (Surabaya Pos, 30 September 1981) giving more 
details about the case. 
The district-head of Kediri, Usri Sastradiredja is quoted 
as saying that because doubts had been raised regarding the 
complaints of the peasants, "bearing in mind the latent 
danger of the communist threat, the fact that two ex-G30S/ 
PKI persons under reporting requirements ( walap) were in-
volved, and the occurrence of social disturbances during the 
month of September* for the last two years", he had 
handed the lawyer over to the military. 
A military officer, Major Soediyanto, stressed that his 
task was to guide the inhabitants of his territory and direct 
social developments, particularly with regard to G30S/PKI 
remnants. "Communism is a latent danger because com-
munist ideology in a person's brain will never disappear 
until that person is dead", he is quoted as saying. 
*September is the month when security agencies "intensify vigi-
lance" on the grounds that "disturbances" are more likely to 
happen to "commemorate" the events in September-October 1965. 
Where did that happen? mother and the children. But we couldn't do anything. We 
In an interrogation centre in Gunung Sari II, Jakarta, a tried to trace him but had no success whatever. 
torture centre, in 1966. That was the centre of Operasi 
Kalong, under Major Saroso. Acep was the man who threat-
ened to take the daughter away. 
There is a working group of the U .N. Commission of 
Human Rights dealing with disappearances. One of the 
essential things in classifying a case as a disappearance, is 
that the person is know to have been- taken into custody by 
the government, but no account is given of what happened. 
Many thousands have disappeared and have never been 
accounted for. It's necessary to press the government to 
say what happened to them. There are women who still 
can't remarry because they don't know whether their 
husbands are alive or dead, they have no documents about 
them. They face all kinds of legal problems, about inheri-
tance and so on. In the case of the girl I was just talking 
about, it's pretty certain she is still alive, so it's a question 
of tracing her. If there are cases of disappearances among 
Muslim prisoners, it is important to have information 
because they can be taken up by the U.N. Working Group. 
The question of disappearances has become a big inter-
We once made an enquiry with the International Red Cross, 
which runs a tracing service. We asked them about the 
possibility of tracing disappeared persons, and they said 
they could do it, but the application must come from 
the family, not from outsiders. 
This is an example of how we can cooperate in a concrete 
way. This is what we are lacking in Indonesia-the know-
ledge about international procedures, the forums abroad we 
can use in our struggle for human rights. We Jack access to 
this kind of information and knowledge. So many inter-
national forums exist, like the U.N. Human Rights Com-
mission, the ILO, UNESCO, the Red Cross, which can be 
beneficial to our struggle. We are ignorant of these things. If 
you can inform us about the procedures, then we can 
cooperate. If the Red Cross needs a formal complaint from 
the family, we can work that out. If only you give us the 
names and addresses, we will approach the families. Please 
ask this woman to get in touch with us. 
national campaign, but Indonesia has not yet been taken up I don't have any more questions, but I'd like to thank you 
as a major country where disappearances have occurred. very much for this interview. 
Yet Indonesia could possibly be said to be the country All I would like to say in conclusion is that we should be 
where the problem of disappearances first started. open to each other and try to cooperate for the cause of 
I remember the case in 1965 of Sutedja, the governor of human rights and justice. I think we need each other. That's 
Bali. It was a very sad story. The family came to me, the all I need to say. 
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MILITARY KARYAWAN* IN INDONESIA7 S 
TOP CENTRAL BUREAUCRACY 
A well-researched analysis of the patterns of military 
control of the Indonesian higher central bureaucracy draws 
the conclusion that military karyawan* play a crucial role 
in maintaining the Suharto regime in power. They now 
occupy half the positions in this bureaucracy. Within the 
two government departments most essential in maintaining 
the regime, military control is complete or near complete : 
the Department of Defence and Security (I 00%) and the 
Department of Home Affairs (89%). 
The analysis, which recently came into our hands, makes 
the important point that there is no practical evidence 
suggesting an effort to 're-civilianise ' even gradually those 
slots now held by military karyawan in the higher central 
bureaucracy. Civilians are now in the majority only in 
positions with the most specialised functions , (Ministers of 
State and Directors-General), but in both instances work 
mainly under military supervisors . 
The higher central bureaucracy under scrutiny in this 
analysis includes the Presidency (President and Vice-
President ); the State Secretariat (eight key aides supporting 
the Presidency); three Senior coordinating Ministers, each 
overseeing several Cabinet Departments ; three Ministers of 
State; seventeen Ministers ; six Junior Ministers; eighteen 
people at Secretary-General level ; seventeen Inspectors-
General empowered to enquire into any matter in their 
Departments; and seventy-one Directors-General subordinate 
to their respective Secretaries-General. 
Dealing with military domination in the Defence and 
Home Affairs Departments, the analysis, which is based on 
a wealth of published books, articles and publicly available 
Indonesian government directories and publications, points 
out: 
1. That internal armed forces personnel and organisational 
changes in 1965-66, 1969-70, 1974-7 5 and 1978-81 increas-
ingly concentrated power centrally in the Army, the 
Defence Ministry in Jakarta and in the person of the· 
Defence Minister; 
2. that military penetration of the Department of Home 
Affairs has risen more markedly since 1965 than in any 
other Department (from 29% of the leading positions in 
1966, to 71 % in 1971and89% in 1981). 
There is apparently no Department in which the military 
is not suitably placed, through filling the Secretary-General 
or Inspector-General slots or more usually both, to control 
and keep track of all Departmental activities. Direct Presi-
dential involvement in Departmental affairs serves to 
maintain these capabilities. The topmost technocrats and 
career civil servants, whose tenure depends on maintaining 
the .trust of military patrons, are at least as active public 
proponents of government policies as the military karyawan. 
Another important point is that assignments for military 
personnel within the bureaucracy now carry higher rank 
and prestige. The attractiveness of the military karyawan 
role has been enhanced because the Army, the most presti-
gious of the four services, occupies 81 % of military 
karyawan positions: and because the military ranks of those 
holding these positions have risen sharply (from Lieu-
tenants-Colonels to Major-Colonels in the case of the Army) 
since 1965. 
Top posts in the bureaucracy are virtually monopolised 
by that faction of the "1945 Generation" (those who 
fought actively against the Dutch in 1945) loyal to Suharto. 
These officers clearly intend to hold onto their powerbase 
for at least the next five years. There is an effective system 
of controlling the loyalties of retired karyawan by holding 
military rank promotion exercises for them and requiring 
them to join the Association of Retired Members of the 
Indonesian Armed Forces (PEPABRI), through which 
loyalty to the Armed Forces is reinforced. 
The writer believes that the 1945 Generation faction 
loyal to Suharto intends to retain its domination in the 
higher central bureaucracy in order to ensure a smooth 
transfer of leadership in the Army staff and command 
structure to the "Young Generation" officers (graduates of 
the Magelang Military Academy) but suggests that this 
formula for generational succession is unlikely to succeed. 
The formula would appear to be that for some indeterm-
inate time to come, there will continue to be a sharp and 
unprecedented rift between two major military power 
centres, with the 1945 Generation military karyawan 
controlling politics and the "Young Generation" officers in 
the Army staff and command structure controlling the 
guns. It is far from clear that the "Young Generation" 
Army officers will accept their subordinate political role in 
this emerging new-model New Order. The result will be that 
the latter will increasingly question the meaning of the 
armed forces' dual function (dwi-fungsi). 
Power Concentration 
In an attempt to describe the concentration of power 
within the top bureaucracy, the writer points out that, 
informally, power is concentrated in the President with the 
State Secretary acting as an effective screen. The Coordina-
ting Minister for Economic, Financial and Industrial Affairs 
(Wijoyo Nitisastro) and the Department Ministers under the 
Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs, and 
to a lesser extent this Coordinating Minister himself 
(General Panggabean) are best able to gain access to the 
President. The Commander of KOPKAMTIB, Admiral 
Sudomo, has unique Presidential access although he is 
nominally under the Minister of Defence. 
A breakdown of the 50% share of positions in the higher 
central bureaucracy held by military karyawan is given as 
follows: 
*Karya.wan: functionary . The word used instead of 'worker', to conceal the difference between employer and employee. 
It has 111 fact come to be used mamly for senior officials. 
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SEVEN JENGGAWAH PEASANTS IN DETENTION 
Seven peasants from Jenggawah, East Java, have been in 
detention for eight months because the authorities suspect 
that they were planning to incite other peasants to refuse to 
plant tobacco for State Plantation XXVIII. 
Some of the men have been in detention before and 
were brought to trial on anti-subversion charges in early 
1980. (They were subsequently acquitted.) 
The dispute over tobacco cultivation in Jenggawah has 
been going for many years (See TAPOL Bulletins no . 36, 
October 1979 and No. 38, March 1980). It involves the use 
of land previously tilled by peasants to grow rice and 
secondary crops. Eventually, the company won control 
over the land which gives it the power to require the 
peasants to use the land for tobacco cultivation for five 
months in every two years. This incurs considerable losses 
by comparison with the profits to be earned from planting 
Continued from opposite page 
*the President (a 4-star general); 
*seven of his eight principal aides in the State Secretariat; 
*two of the three coordinating Ministers; 
*eight of the seventeen Department Ministers; 
*two of the six Junior Ministers; 
*sixteen of the seventeen Inspector-Generals; 
*twenty-five of seventy-one Director-General level posts. 
In addition the Head and deputy Head of BAKIN, the State 
Intelligence Coordinating Body which is responsible for 
internal security estimates, are both military, and report 
directly to the President. 
rice or other food crops. 
Last May the seven arrested men were ordered to sign 
statements guaranteeing that the peasants involved would 
not refuse to grow tobacco. They said that they could not 
give such a guarantee and were arrested the next day . After 
interrogation by the East Java military command, they 
were transferred to Jember Prison and have been detained 
there ever since. Throughout the tobacco planting season, 
they were not allowed to receive visits from their families. 
Tempo reports (2 January 1982) that the seven men are 
due to appear in court soon on charges of "incitement". 
According to the Tempo report from Jenggawah, there 
appear to have been no moves by peasants to resist orders 
to plant tobacco. The harvest has however been extremely 
unsatisfactory. Only 35% of the crop survived heavy rain-
falls and the peasants have sustained severe losses. 
creasingly to rest. 
There appears to be no plan, the writer concludes, for a 
generational succession among the military karyawan in the 
higher central bureaucracy, or if it does exist, it is not a 
subject of general public discussion, as is the succession for 
active military duty in the staff and command structure . To 
hammer home this point, he quotes President Suharto as 
referring in a speech delivered last November to his desire 
to spend the rest of his life in the service of the people. This 
is seen as being Suharto's indirect Javanese way of saying 
that he intends to remain President for life. As an indication 
of the absence of any succession between the two genera-
Defence Department tions, it is pointed out that there is not a single Magelang 
Crucial to military domination is the total military Academy graduate officer within the higher central bureau-
control of the Department of Defence. The prolonged cracy, 
process of concentrating power at the centre (in the · The evidence points to an important conclusion: that 
Defence Department) began with the reshuffling, dismissal, the rift which is developing between the political structure 
detention, or killing of military officers considered un- and the army command structure confines the "Young 
reliable in the purges and battles following the murders of . Generation" officers to a continuing secondary and subor-
six Army generals in 1965. Then in the six months pre- dinate role. Thus it appears that only the "1945 Generation" 
ceding April 1970, the four service heads were downgraded, officers, and more specifically those loyal to Suharto, are 
losing operational control over their respective forces. A achieving the top positions in the civil side of ABRI's dwi 
revised system of Regional Defence Commands (KOWIL- fungsi whilst the "Young Generation" remain confined to 
HAN) integrating services in the field, together with the the military side. It is doubtful whether such an arrangement 
removal of local people from top command positions can remain stable, and in any event, its longevity is 
outside Java effectively ended any threat of "warlordism". inherently limited by the ageing and dying off of the 1945 
These changes also institutionalised Army dominance over Generation. Even on the military side of dwi fungsi, control 
the other services. still remains firmly in the hands of the "1945 Generation". 
Further centralisation followed the January 1974 It strains credibility to think that the "1945 Generation" 
Malari affair. And particularly after General Yusuf s will voluntarily relinquish on schedule the top Hankam * 
appointment as Minister of Defence in 1978, still more posts which it now so tightly grasps as levers controlling the 
power flowed to the centre as a consequence of the neyd to career prospects of the Army's "Young Generation". 
deal among other things with the resistance in East Timor The process envisaged whereby "Young Generation" 
and increased expenditure on arms and equipment modern- officers might start questioning the operational meaning of 
isation. ABRl's dwi fungsi could lead to the emergence ot the more 
As for ABRI's dominance in the Department of Home politically skilled "Young Generation" officers. Already the 
Affairs, this is a manifestation of ABRI's need to control or Suharto faction's deviation from the original concept of 
oversee the governmental apparatus from provincial down dwi fungsi is under attack from widely respected "1945 
to village level, to assure favourable results in periodic Generation" 'outs' such as General Nasution, the man who 
electoral exercises and to advance regional development originated the concept. 
projects on which the regime's legitimacy has come in- *Ministry of Defence 
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Was Genera l Suharto, Indonesia's president, involved in the 
1965 J6th September Movement, the movement he has RMIND 
Jlways denounced as a communist attempt to take power? DID SUHARTO MASTE 
Was he the manipu lator , the man behind the scenes, the 
one who conceived the whole thing as a provocation which 
would , in one stroke, eliminate his rivals in the Army, napped in order to pre-empt and thwart a CIA-backed coup 
Jnni hila te the Communist Party and remove President being planned by a Council of Generals to remove the ailing 
Sukarno from power? President Sukarno from power and reverse Indonesia's 
These questions are now being raised inside Indonesia domestic and foreign policies. The statement also con-
where. until recently, no-one dared publicly to question the demned corruption among high-ranking Anny officers. 
Army's and Suharto's version of what happened in 1965. Within hours, Suharto, then a Lieutenant-General in 
The official version has been the justification for all that command of the Army's Strategic Command, KOSTRAD, 
has happe ned since-the violent , wholesale slaughter of succeeded in encircling the air-force base used by the 
hundreds of thousands of people, the prolonged incarcera- kidnappers, and launched a counter-attack that was to leave 
tion of tens of thousands of people without trial , and the the Indonesian Communist Party decimated and paralysed, 
creation of a security apparatus with unrestricted powers the entire leftwing movement outlawed and in disarray, and 
to repress and intimidate the entire population. the Anny and government apparatus throughly purged of 
The questions have been raised in two separate docu- Jeftwing and pro-Suharto elements. By mid-March 1966, 
ments. One has been distributed openly to senior military Sukarno had been forced to surrender his powers to 
and civil authorities: the other is circulating anonymously Suharto who was soon afterwards formally instaOed 'con-
among dissident groups. The first document, dated 10th stitutionally' as President. 
December 1981 , is a Jetter signed by Sunardi , a lawyer still From the very start, however, not everyone was 
practising in Jakarta. Jn it , he calls for the postponement of prepared to accept the official version of events. This 
the May 1982 general elections so that a thorough investiga- placed the blame squarely on the Indonesian Communist 
tion of Suharto ·s role in the 1965 a ff air can be undertaken Party which was said to have manipulated the Untung 
in order '"to clear up doubts in society" . Sunardi's Jetter conspiracy by means of a Special Bureau operating directly 
was sent , on the headed notepaper of his law office , to all under the Party's chairman, D. N. Aidit. He and other 
provincial governors. military commanders and leading members of the Party's Politbureau were soon murdered, 
officials of Parliament and the People 's Consultative and Syam, subsequently identified as chairman of the 
Assembly , Indonesia's upper chamber. Special Bureau, began to appear frequently as an obliging 
The anonymous document takes the challenge farther. and well-informed prosecution witness in many of the 
It directly accuses Suharto of involvement in the 30th military trials that were to follow. Syam was himself tried 
September Movement. It charges him with being, at the and sentenced to death but still remains a privileged prison-
very least, an accomplice with foreknowledge in the murder er, frequently allowed out of detention on mystery 
of the six generals against whom the Movement was 'missions'. 
directed. It accuses him , as the man wielding power at the The questions raised first centred around the mysterious 
time , of being responsible for the "inhuman hounding, Syam. Was he Aidit 's man, or was he a plant? Was he in fact 
murder in custody and massacre of communists". At one working for Army intelligence? And why, some people 
point, it refers to Suharto as the dalang, the manipulator , began to ask, had Suharto himself, well-known as anti-
the man behind the scenes. communist and corruptor, not been included on the list of 
These documents are the latest in a series of revelations, generals to be kidnapped? Why did Untung's troops occupy 
some originating from statements made by Suharto himself, several crucial communications centres in Jakarta yet ignore 
which have built up a substantial case for him to answer. Suharto's own headquarters at KOSTRAD which was 
To demonstrate their significance , the established facts equipped with a powerful short-wave communication 
about the 30th September Movement should first be set system? And how could one explain the fact that two of 
forth. It was on the night of 30th September/1st October the tliree Army officers at the helm of the Movement, 
1965 that kidnap squads captured six Army generals. A Untung and Latief, were close associates and personal 
seventh, General Nasution, escaped though his small friends of Suharto, having served under him on several 
daughter was fatally wounded. All six generals, including occasions? 
General Yani , commander of the Army, were killed on the More specific evidence against Suharto began to accumu-
spot or a few hours later at an airforce base on the out- late however when a US journalist, Arnold Brackman, 
skirts of Jakarta. The Movement was led by three Army reportinganinterviewwithhiminhisbook, The Communist 
officers, Lieutenant-Colonel Untung, commander of the Collapse in Indonesia (1968) quoted Suharto as saying that 
First Battalion of the Cakrabirawa Palace Guard Regiment, he met Latief only a few hours before the kidnap squads 
Colonel l.atief, commander of the Mobile Infantry Brigade embarked on their missions. They met, Suharto said, at the 
of the Jakarta Military Command, and Brigadier-General Anny Hospital in Jakarta where Suharto's son was recover-
Supardjo, commander of the Army's Combat Command in ing from bums sustained in an accident. The meeting took 
Kalimantan. place at the improbable hour for a hospital visit of 11 pm. 
It was claimed in a statement broadcast early on I st Suharto realised later on reflection, or so he told Brackman 
October from the Jakarta Radio Station which was briefly that Latief had come not to visit his son but to see whethe; 
occupied hy rebel troops, that the generals had been kid- he was sufficiently pre-occupied with his son's condition to 
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THE 1965 "COUP ATTEMPT"? 
and the Latief Trial : A Painful Revelation" which was 
published in July 1978 (see T APOL Bulletin No . 29 , 
1978), is kn own to have circulated within the Army. 
Sunardi 's demand for an investigation is supported by a 
long extract from an Appeal Memorandum submitted last 
be unlikely to launch a counter-attack on the next day. September by another of his clients , Sawito Kartowibowo , 
Two years after Brackman's book appeared , the meeting who was tried and found guilty of subversion in 1978. 
was mentioned by Suharto in an interview with the German Sawito was sentenced to eight years and is still in prison. 
weekly, Der Spiegel, in June 1970. This time, however, he In his Memo, Sawito asked why it was that he was charged 
put a different construction on the meeting. Asked why , in under Indonesia 's draconian anti-subversion law yet Latief 
his opinion , he was not among the generals kidnapped, was not. Had this law been used in Latiefs case he would 
Suharto recalled Latiefs late-night visit to the hospital, and almost certainly have got a death sentence which is not 
said : "He came there to kill me but apparently didn't go included as a penalty under the Criminal Code for the 
ahead as he was afraid of doing it in a public place ." But offences he was charged with. In the event , Latief was 
could this explanation be taken seriously? Would Latief sentenced to life though both Untung and Supardjo had 
have contemplated committing a murder at that time, been executed. Sawito sought to explain this apparent 
thus raising the alarm and aborting the rest of the action? anomaly by describing Latiefs close relationship with 
Suharto's two statements about the Latief meeting were Suharto and by referring to his two last-minute meetings 
discussed in an article published in late 1970 by Professor with Suharto. But there could be other reasons . Is it not 
W. F. Wertheim, a Dutch expert on Indonesian affairs. The possible that Latief is being kept alive by people inside 
article, entitled "Suharto and the Un tung Coup : The the Army who may be only too happy to use his evidence, 
Missing Link", came to the conclusion that the mystery when the time comes, to remove Suharto from power? 
surrounding the hospital meeting could remain unsolved It took nearly 13 years for the men in charge to bring 
''until Latief is able and prepared to talk". At that time, Latief to trial. During the course of his own trial in 1978, 
Latief was in detention, still untried, and still suffering Sawito asserted that General Ali Said , then Attorney-
from gunshot wounds inflicted during his arrest in 1965. General and now Justice Minister, had more than enough 
Many years later, in May 1978, Latief was brought to evidence about Suharto to bring an indictment against him 
trial, long after his co-conspirators, Untung and Supardjo, after his removal from power. Evidence about what? The 
had been sentenced to death and executed . Here at last was reports of his trial so far available did not specify. 
his opportunity to speak and much to everyone's surprise, Savito's Memo also pointed out that by refusing to 
he did talk about the meeting. Besides describing his long summon Suharto as a witness in the Latief trial , the court 
personal friendship and association with Suharto, he told had only reinforced doubts raised by Latief s revelations. 
the court that he met Suharto twice, not once, in the 58 Hence, the need for an investigation. So much, then for the 
hours before the kidnaps took place. On the first occasion, case made by Sunardi and Sawito. 
it was on a social occasion where he met Suharto. They The document circulating anonymously is far more 
talked about the Council of Generals said to be planning a outspoken in tone. No mention is made of the need for 
coup and Suharto said he was checking up on these reports. investigations. Suharto is bluntly accused of culpability for 
Then, explaining what happened at the hospital on the the murder of the generals . He is accused of having actively 
night of 30th September, Latief said: encouraged Un tung and his colleagues in their action, 
The truth is that on that night I not only went to see even to the extent of bringing troops into Jakarta for use 
his son who had had an accident but also reported that a by Latief, though whether they were actually used in this 
movement would be launched on the following morning role is not clear. It is claimed that he then turned against 
to prevent a coup d'etat by the Council of Generals Latief and the others. He appointed himself commander of 
which he already knew about beforehand. the Army which was now bereft of its commander even 
After making this disclosure, Latief formally requested though Sukarno had appointed another General, Prano, to 
that Suharto and his wife should appear as witnesses. The take over. Then followed the clamp-down, the massacres, 
court ignored this request . One of the lawyers defending the routing of the leftwing and eventually the removal of 
Latief at his trial was Sunardi, the man now making the Sukarno from power. In other words, it was not a coup 
demand for an investigation into Suharto's role. attempt by the communists, but a devastatingly successful 
Latief pointed out that Suharto should at the very least coup by Suharto. 
be considered an accomplice, since he knew force was being The most striking section of this document is an 
planned against the generals yet did nothing to warn them appendix which traces Suharto's growing animosity towards 
or provide them with protection. As Latief told the court, General Yani who was appointed Army commander in 
this made Suharto far more heavily implicated than the 1962. Suharto had wanted the post , and from then on 
hundreds of thousands of people who were subsequently schemed for Yani's removal , seeking commanding posts for 
killed, arrested or dismissed from their jobs for alleged himself to reinforce his own position, and planning the 
involvement in the 30th September Movement. posting of Untung and Latief, both of whom he trusted as 
Latiefs sensational revelation was never published in the supporters. When Yani was killed on 30th September 1965, 
Indonesian press though reports about it spread among most other generals were killed with him , leaving Suharto in 
dissident circles and, more significantly, among Army charge of the Army alone to deal with Sukarno in his own 
officers. A second article by Wertheim, entitled, "Suharto way . The document hints that Yani supporters still nurse a 
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CARRINGTON'S VISIT: A BOOST FOR BUSINESS 
Lord Carrington with Radius Prawiro, Indonesia's Minister· 
of Trade 
The rapidly intensifying cooperation between the British 
Government and the Suharto regime (reported in Bulletin 
No. 48) received another boost when the Foreign Secre-
tary, Lord Carrington, paid a three-day visit to Jakarta from 
27 January, as part of his tour of ASEAN capitals . The 
Indonesian press regard this trip as "not of a political 
nature" but a "trade mission" (Tempo 6 February 1982), 
with Carrington clearly acting as little more than a broker 
for British business interests. Accompanying Carrington on 
this trip were seven top British industrialists, all hoping to 
extend their present activities in Indonesia and attracted by 
the prospect of US$3bn . worth of contracts (FT 1 February 
1982). 
Arms Sales 
ln the field of arms sales were Sir Frederick Page, 
Managing Director of British Aerospace, plus Sir Arnold 
Hall and Guy Checketts, chairman and Executive Director 
respectively of Hawker Siddeley aircraft, all hoping to 
increase their sales of Hawk ground-attack jets and HS-748 
'Coastguarders', transporters which can be used for freight-
and paratroop drops. Of the eight Hawks already sold to 
Ir.donesia , four are said to have crashed (Times 1.2.82). Sir 
Edward Ashmore of Racal Electronics was also present ; 
Racal specialise in arms-related equipment such as avionics, 
electronic communications, radio surveillance and so on. 
A second major element of the visit was the signing of 
Britain's biggest ever export credit to Indonesia. Worth 
£ 125 m., and negotiated by Lloyds Bank International with 
facilities provided by the Export Credits Guarantee Depart-
ment of the UK Government, this is to help pay for a £550 
m. extension to the oil refining project at Balikpapan (East 
Kalimantan). The major contractor involved in this project 
is Bechtel (Great Britain), subsidiary of the American-
owned group (whose labour policies are outlined opposite). 
Another 100 UK companies are ready to supply goods and 
services. Farmers Boilers has already won a contract to 
supply £19 m. worth of furnaces . 
Also riding on the Carrington bandwagon was Sir John 
Buckley of Davy International Ltd . Davy recently lost a 
valuable contract on the methanol project on Bunyu Island 
to their West German competitors Lurgi as a result of the 
1980 'trade war' between Indonesia and Britain (see 
Bulletin No. 48). Now that the 'war' has been resolved, 
they are looking for a US$ 4000 m. contract for a cold steel 
rolling mill , part of a US$ 2.5 bn. extension planned for the 
Krakatau Steel works at Cilegon (West Java). Others on the 
trip were Sir Jack Wellings, reported to be representing a 
group of 600 UK companies, A. H. J. Hoskins, Manageing 
Director of Matthew Hall, and D. A. Holland, Managing 
Director of Balfour Beatty, whose interests in Indonesia 
were also reported in Bulletin No . 48. 
Carrington himself was reported to have expressed par-
ticular interest in 'energy development'. (FEER 5.2.82) 
This may refer to the joint contract involving Rio Tinto 
Zinc, of which he was once Director, and British Petroleum 
for the exploration and development of coal on a 750,000 
ha. concession in East Kalimantan (FT 16.7 .81 ). 
British business interests seem increasingly eager to 
supply the necessary technology of repression. On a pre-
continued from page 13 government are themselves backing this challenge, it may 
deep grudge against Suharto, and could take "unconven· not prove so easy to do as it has been in the past. 
tional measures" against him if redress is not speedily taken It is not easy to predict where these latest challenges 
by legal means. will lead. So far nothing has appeared in the press apart 
There is little doubt that this renewed interest in from a brief reference in the Financial Times (21 December 
Suharto's role is related to attempts to forestall Suharto's 1981 ). Reports have been received that Sunardi is under 
re-election as President which will follow inevitably after interrogation, possibly under arrest. 
the May elections. Sunardi himself has clearly taken great It is not likely, without severe upheavals in the Anny, 
care to act on his own, basing himself solely on information that Suharto will ever be called to account. But as evidence 
to which he had access in the performance of his profess- continues to mount against him, the enonnity of his crime 
ional duties as the defence lawyer of both Latief and will be understood most profoundly by the millions of 
Sawito. Speaking as a lawyer, he has confined himself to people whose lives have been shattered since 1965 all in the 
demanding an investigation. Others would appear to be name of "involvement" in the 30 September Movement. 
pursuing more political objectives. The two documents are Meanwhile, the Western governments who rallied to 
apparently quite separate though it is obvious that Suharto Suharto's support, ignoring the bloodshed that accompan-
will lump them both together. Sunardi, the one person to ied his takeover, will no doubt continue to trade and deal 
have exposed himself so daringly, is bound to be the first with a regime that came to power by means of acts of 
victim of any moves to suppress this latest challenge to provocation hardly paralleled in modem history, not even 
Suharto's authority. But if people high up in the Anny and by the Reichstag fire. Carmel Budiardjo 
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Continued from opposite page 
paratory visit prior to Carr!ngton's, the Minister for 
Industry and lnfonnation Technology, Kenneth Baker , 
announced British Government hopes for increased sales of 
high technology goods and services in the fields of tele-
communications, information technology and aerospace (as 
well as biotechnology and pharmaceuticals). For example , 
Logica, one of the UK's leading software houses , has 
recently won a contract worth £500,000 to supply soft-
ware for satellite systems (Indonesian Times 16.1.82). This 
marks a substantial shift in emphasis away from the 
banking, insurance and management consultancy services 
that dominated the British presence in Jakarta during the 
1970s. 
"No Pressing Bilateral Issues" 
Carrington admits that the British Government has virtually 
no political differences with the Indonesian military author-
ities. British-Indonesian relations had "never been better", 
he said . There are "no pressing bilateral issues". As reported 
in Bulletin No. 48, the 1980 "trade war" over Indonesian 
textile exports to the UK was successfully resolved, partic-
ularly in order to maintain the sale of Hawk jets. 
BRITISH INVESTORS BENEFIT FROM 
LABOUR REPRESSION 
Bechtel, the contractors in Balikpapan which, as we 
reported in TAPOL Bulletin No. 49, refused to pay 
agreed food allowances to their workers over a ten-
month period from January 1981, is in fact the 
British company, Bechtel (Great Britain) which will 
benefit from the £125m. credit arranged by the UK 
Government . 
As we reported in our last issue, 1,300 workers 
attempted to enter into negotiations last November, 
but their peaceful sit-in was broken up by an anti-
riot squad from the East Kalimantan police command, 
(KODAK). After their forced return to work, the 
workers continued to be guarded by security guards 
in plain clothes (Merdeka, 28 November, 1981). 
To push Indonesian exports, foreign suppliers are now 
required to purchase an equivalent value of non-gas or -oil 
products from Indonesia. 
However, Indonesian Trade Minister, Radius Prawiro, 
was able to reassure Carrington that such export rulings will 
be implemented "smoothly and with intelligence" with 
provision for "exceptions" (Tempo, 6. February 1982). 
Such backing off is usual. The Indonesian Government can 
hardly maintain a hard line against the foreign investors it is 
desperately trying to attract. There has been a sudden 
worsening balance of payments problem, caused by a re-
duction in oil income (70 per cent of government revenue) 
and a drop in the export of other goods . Direct income 
from business interests is a necessary supplement to official 
"military budgets" to finance expenditure on arms as well 
as luxurious lifestyles. 
BUDGETNEWS-THEPOORMAKETHE 
SACRIFICES 
On 4 January 1982, the subsidies on eight types of oil , 
including kerosene which is used throughout Indonesia 
for cooking and lighting, were cut , causing domestic price 
rises of 60- 66.7%. Reports from Java say that this has sent 
prices of other commodities rocketing. Then , from April 
subsidies on rice, flour and sugar are being reduced by 
39.2% which will push prices up even further. The inflation 
rate for the coming year is generally predicted to rise to 
20-30%. 
Such dramatic increases in the price of essential goods 
follow on from a domestic oil price rise of 50% in May 
1980 and the 33% devaluation of the rupiah in November 
1978 (KENOP 15) and their respective inflationary effects. 
This means that the Indonesian people have faced four 
years of crippling price rises. For example, the price of a 
litre of kerosene has risen from Rp. 18 in 1978 to Rp. 60 in 
1982. 
Announcing the 1982-83 Budget, Suharto said: "Let us 
be willing to make sacrifices for the sake of development" . 
But it is always interesting to see who exactly makes 
sacrifices. For example, while food subsidies are cut by 
Ro. 121.3 bn. and fuel subsidies by Rp. 587.1 bn. , there is 
to be an increase in "communications and tourism develop-
ment expenditure" of Rp. 288.1 bn. 
As Susumu Awanohara in the FEER says, this new 
budget "is likely to have a regressive redistributive effect, 
hurting lower-income groups relatively more." In blunter 
words, the poor are to pay for increased expenditure in 
areas which do not benefit them. For those millions of 
Indonesians who could barely feed themselves and their 
children last year, we can only speculate how they will 
manage in the coming year. Between 30 and 50% of the 
country 's 1981 population of 15 5 million live below the 
poverty line, depending on the measurement used. 
(Financial Times Survey 21/12/81). Civil servants, com-
paratively well-off by Indonesian standards , have been told 
that their salaries will definitely not be raised . Industrial 
workers who demand wage rises to keep pace with inflation 
will no doubt continue to face the sack or military violence. 
(See this issue, page 16) 
Quoting Awanohara again, " .. the 1982-83 budget will 
be remembered not only for its substantial cuts but for its 
comprehensive statement of Suharto's development philo-
sophy". To this we may add "the World Bank's philosophy'', 
for it is on the Bank's advice that these major price hikes 
have been ordered. That Suharto can bring in such a series 
of unpopular measures at this time indicates his confidence 
at being able to 'manage' the forthcoming elections. 
FEER 15.1.82, Tempo 9.1.82, 16.1.82, FT 21.12.81 
Over-Reaction 
In Surabaya the sudden formation of long queues at 
the petrol stations after the announcement of immi-
nent petrol price rises unnerved the authorities, and a 
fully-armed unit was sent in to 'guard the peace' . 
(Tempo 9.1.82) 
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WORKERS UNDER ATTACK 
The Head of the All Indonesia Contractors' Labour Union 
(PBKSI). S. M. Pardede. has confirmed that the picture for 
contractors' workers is "very gloomy and without future". 
In any disagreement between workers and employers, he 
said, the workers always lose because they are unable to get 
support from the labour laws, and no government depart-
ment or other social ogranisation is willing to aid them. 
Most are employed without security, as casual, daily or 
seasonal workers. They live in barracks and many are only 
paid Rp. 500/day net. l11ey live below any decent standard 
of living, he added, but, because of unemployment, they 
are forced to accept whatever conditions there are. 
(Merdeka 22 .12.81) 
In the words of the Head of the Legal Aid Team of the 
All Indonesia Labour Federation (FBSI), Azhar Achmad, 
the abuse of human rights in labour affairs in Indonesia 
today has reached "the most disturbing levels, more so than 
in any other field" . In an interview with the newspaper 
Merdeka on "Human Rights Day", he called for the inter-
vention of the Government since the widespread prevention 
of workers from forming their own organisations constitutes 
an abuse of workers' human rights. He said that workers 
who try in any way to improve their fate are given the 
sack; they have effectively lost their voice. He estimated 
that only 10- 25% of workers enjoy respect for their rights, 
adding that young women workers suffer the most, 
especially domestic servants, 'hostesses' and masseuses. 
(Merdeka 14.12.81) 
About 1000 women workers from massage parlours, 'steam-
baths' and brothels in the centre of Jakarta have recently 
been taking action against the closure of their workplaces 
ordered by the Vice-Governor of the city in an attempt to 
'clean-up· the city centre before the elections. In one case, 
having worked through the night to produce banners, 
pamphlets and a document for the Regional People's 
Assembly (DPRD), their action only lasted one hour before 
the police were sent in to break it up. The women are pro-
testing that without employment they will be unable to 
feed their children, but one employer, from PT Metro-
politan which manages the Shinta massage parlour, referred 
to the workers' actions as "hysterical" and "very. 
emotional". 
Meanwhile, workers of all kinds find their only 'trade 
union', the FBSI, unable or unwilling to represent their 
interests properly. The Head of the Army's Security and 
Order Command (KOPKANTIB), Sudomo, continues to 
regard the FBSI as a useful puppet organisation. At a 
meeting of the National Council of the FBSI in December, 
he urged it to cooperate with the Chamber of Commerce 
(KADIN) to "overcome" conflicts between workers and 
employers. It should provide caders with "integrity" who 
are "capable of guaranteeing the continued existence of 
enterprises" as well as attending to the welfare of workers. 
(Angkatan Bersenjata 18.12.81) 
In what may well turn out as yet another attempt to 
curb workers' rights, the Director General for the Care and 
Protection of Manpower, Utoyo Usman, has called for the 
total overhaul of Law No. 21 1954. This law deals with 
collective bargaining agreements and is, he says, incompat-
ible with Pancasila labour relations . (Merdeka 15 .12.81) 
MORE ON KOPKAMTIB'S 
ANTI-STRIKE POWERS 
In TAPOL Bulletin No . 48, November 1981, (page 2) 
a KOPKAMTIB Instruction was published. The In-
struction orders local military commands to inter-
vene directly in labour disputes "in accordance with 
existing powers and guided by Presidential Decree 
No. 7, 1963". 
In response to a request to readers for information 
about this 1963 decree, a copy has been sent to 
T APOL by INDOC, Holland. 
Decree No. 7, 1963 imposes a penalty of up to 
one year's imprisonment for anyone 
"implementing or taking part in strikes or lock-
outs." (Article 2) 
"Strikes" are defined as follows: 
" . .. deliberately ignoring or refusing to carry out 
work or, even though there is an official order, 
being reluctant to, or slow to implement work that 
must be performed because of one's official 
position." (Article I) 
The decree also extends the penalty to anyone 
"who provides opportunity for, provokes, calls on, 
suggests, instigates, encourages, instructs or forces 
(others to) carry out strikes ... " (Article 3) 
The decree is related to "vital enterprises" and 
three lists of these enterprises are given in a sub-
sequent Presidential Decision No. 123, 1963. By not 
referring to these lists, KOPKAMTIB's Instruction 
apparently extends its powers of direct intervention 
to all enterprises. 
The KOPKAMTIB Instruction clearly provides 
Army commanders with formal powers to ban 
strikes, although such a ban has no basis in Indo-
nesian law. 
(Editor's Note: We are grateful to INDOC for provid-
ing the Decree, to complete our analysis of KOP-
KAMTIB's strike-breaking powers.) 
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ACHEHNESE PRISONERS TORTURED 
The following report received from Achehnese refugees in Sweden describes the tortures inflicted by the Indonesian army 
on Mohammad Sjarif Usman, a student (20 ), who was granted asylum in Sweden in October 1981 . 
Mohammad Sjarif Usman was arrested by troops of the 
KODAM I Division, in Medan, on September 14, 1978, 
without any formal charges except being found in the com-
pany of the leader of the National Liberation Front of 
Acheh-Sumatra, a relative of his who happened to be visit-
ing the house where he was staying in Medan. 
Three other persons were arrested at the same time, in 
the same house: Tengku Djuned, the host; Tengku Muham-
mad Usman Lampoh Awe, a leader of the NLF who was 
visiting Medan at the time; and Sjech Abdullah Hamzah, an 
uncle of Mohammad Sjarif Usman. They were arrested by 
Kopasandha (para-commando) troops, well-known for their 
brutality. The most brutal among the captors was an officer 
named Budiman Glumpang Minjeuk. Mohammad Sjarif 
Usman, Sjech Abdullah Hamzah and Tengku Djuned were 
taken to the notorious jail in Jalan Gandhi Medan. Tengku 
Muhammad Usman Lampoh Awe, and another man, Fauzi, 
were taken to Lueng Putu army barracks, some 500 miles 
west of Medan, also famous as a torture camp. 
After arriving at Jalan Gandhi Jail, Mohammad Sjarif 
Usman saw Indonesian troops beat and kick his uncle, 
Sjech Abdullah Hamzah, until his ribs were broken. After 
the beating, Hamzah was not allowed to eat anything for a 
week. The man responsible for Hamzah's torture was Ser-
geant-Major Ulil!em Kutatjane. 
Mohammad Sjarif Usman was put in a small cell with a 
bare cement floor, and no ventilation. All his belongings, 
his gold ring, his gold bracelet, and his Honda motorcycle, 
were confiscated by the troops. For the next two days, he 
was questioned without being tortured. On September 17, 
1978, he was taken from his cell and brought to the torture 
chamber, where he was ordered to undress. His pants, 
shoes, shirt and underwear were all taken and he was left 
naked in the cell. Then soldiers came and began to beat, 
kick and assault him. His back was lashed with army belts. 
He was kicked with army boots, rolling from one end of 
the cell to the other. Some grabbed his hair to hold him 
back while others beat him about the stomach and 
chest. Mohammad Sjarif Usman still suffers from chest and 
back pains. 
The soldier most responsible for his torture was Sergeant 
Undang who, when tired, turned him over to another sol-
dier, Djalil Pungut. This man then beat and kicked him 
until he lost consciousness. After regaining consciousness, 
Mohammad Sjarif Usman was delivered to two other 
soldiers whose names were Sitepu and Nasrun. Both of 
them struck him in the face and nose until blood covered 
his body . His teeth were broken and loosened and are still 
in bad shape. 
The next day he was delivered to another soldier by the 
name of Penan Purba, who immediately began to beat and 
kick him. He was returned to his first torturer, Undang, on 
the following day. Undang practised his karate blows on 
him without mercy. 
The next day Mohammad Sjarif Usman was given to 
three soldiers who proceeded to torture him relentlessly. 
They also threatened to take him to the forest and shoot 
him. This continuous torture lasted for 3 months, during 
which time he was given only two meals a day consisting of 
a little rice with a small piece of mouldy salted fish mixed 
with dirty vegetables and grass. 
Three months later he was transferred to Sukamulia 
Prison on Palang Merah Street in Medan where he lived for 
3 months on rice and corn with small pieces of rotten, 
salted fish . During this time he was not interrogated. 
From Sukamulia jail he was brought before TEPERDA 
(Team Pemeriksa Daerah or provincial interrogation team) 
where he was not questioned but ordered to pay money! 
The TEPERDA officers told him that he and his two rela-
tives, Sjach Abdullah Hamzah and Tengku Djuned, must 
each pay Rp. 175,000 for their release. 
Because of his sufferings Mohammad Sjarif Usman asked 
his mother to find the money. She sold everything she had 
and borrowed money but was able to raise only Rp. 
125,000. The other two also raised the money demanded 
and finally gave it to Selamat. Six months later, Mohammad 
Sjarif Usman was released without further formalities while 
Tengku Djuned and Sjech Abdullah Hamzah were trans-
ferred to Bandar Acheh jail where they are still imprisoned. 
As a result of his continuous torture, Mohammad Sjarif 
Usman is still suffering from stomach ulcers (U!cus 
Pepticum), extreme pain in his spinal cord and shoulder 
blades, and ruined teeth. Just before his escape he received 
news that Javanese soldiers had come to his village to arrest 
him again, making it impossible for him to return home. 
The soldiers had left a message telling him to surrender, and 
said that if he did not surrender, they would kill him when 
they next found him. 
THE WATER ROOM 
Accompanying the report of Mohammad Sjarif 
Usman's torture, is a description of a horrifying room 
in Jalan Gandhi Prison, Medan. It is a secret, under-
ground room, lOm x !Om x 20m, and filled with 
water about 1 ~m deep. Prisoners are forced through 
a small hole lm x lm, the only way into the room, 
and made to stand in the water where rats, leeches, 
//a~r ~ 
v 
..... . ' 
lizards and larvae swim around. Most of the prisoners 
placed there either die or suffer mental disorders. It is 
little wonder Jalan Gandhi has gained the reputation 
of being one of the most barbaric jails, well-known 
for the torture of prisoners. 
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East Timor: 
WHITLAM ATTACKS BISHOP OF DILi 
In the wake of critical reports and editorial comments 
during December and January in the Australian press about 
the situation in East Timor, the Indonesian Government 
made hasty arrangements, which were kept secret till the 
last moment, for Gough Whitlam, former Australian Prime 
Minister to visit East Tirnor. He was accompanied by Peter 
Hastings, Foreign Editor of the Sydney Morning Herald. 
The visit was said to have been organised in order to ob-
tain an "independent assessment'' of conditions in East 
Timor (source : The Herald, Melbourne, 3 March 1982). It 
is hard to think of any politician outside Indonesia less 
"independent" on East Timor than Gough Whitlam. It was 
he who, as Australian Prime Minister, told Suharto in 
September 1975, during official talks in Jogjakarta, that he 
considered it ''desirable" for East Timor to be integrated 
into Indonesia (The Age, Melbourne, 4 March 1982). Out 
of office since December 1975, Whitlam has consistently 
defended Indonesia's annexation of East Tim or, and has let 
no opportunity pass to claim publicly that all resistance to 
Indonesian occupation is now at an end. 
The visit was described as being "private", despite the 
fact that the invitation came from, and the itinerary was 
arranged by, the Centre for Strategic and International 
Studies, headed by General Ali Murtopo, Indonesia's Minis-
ter of Information (see page 22). The CSIS also arranged a 
visit to East Timar in November 1981 by a dozen or so pro-
Indonesian academics from the USA and Britain. 
From the lengthy reports by Peter Hastings it is clear 
HASTINGS ADMITS: HUNDREDS OF 
PRISONERS DYING ON AT AURO ISLAND 
Campaign to Discredit East Timor Catholic Leader 
Backfires 
Peter Hastings, the pro-integration Australian journalist 
who visited East Timor in March, together with Gough 
Whitlam the Australian Labour Party politician, admits in 
an article about his trip (Age, 6 March 1982) that hundreds 
of Fretilin prisoners have been dying on Atauro, an island 
twenty miles north of Dili, now being used for political 
prisoners. 
The admission comes in the midst of a lengthy attempt 
to discredit a statement made last November by Monsignor 
Martinho da Costa Lopez, the Apostolic Administrator in 
Dili that famine could occur in East Tim or. 
Hastings first casts doubt on Monsignor da Costa Lopez' 
statement about deaths on Atauro by stressing that the 
Monsignor had not visited Atauro Island which is "already 
visible from his window" but fails to explain why he had 
not done so. (Could it not have been because the Indo-
nesian authorities would not allow him to do so?) 
that the main purpose of the visit was to discredit Mon-
signor Martinho da Costa Lopez, the Apostolic Adminis-
trator of Dili and to disprove his letter that a threat of 
famine existed in East Timor (see TAPOL Bulletin No. 49, 
January 1982, page 1 ). 
Bishop described as "wicked" and "mischievous" 
Two comments made by the Indonesian-sponsored visitors 
best show how this was the main purpose of their trip. In 
a press conference in Jakarta after his return, Whitlam said, 
of the letter: "I cannot understand why he perpetrated this 
wicked act and sent this cruel letter. (Age, 6 March 1982.) 
As for Hastings, in an article entitled "Priest's Tale of 
Woe Could Cost East Timor Aid" (Age, 8 March 1982) he 
sets out to prove that if the Indonesian Government now 
refuses aid from Australia out of pique because of un-
favourable publicity over the bishop's letter, it will be the 
bishop's fault. He actually describes the off ending letter as 
"inaccurate and mischievous" because he says, the bishop 
knew 1,000 tonnes of Australian corn was on the way to 
East Timor and that the International Red Cross "disagreed 
with him" about his predictions of famine. 
Hastings could equally have said that he (the bishop) 
disagreed with the Red Cross. Hastings chooses however to 
accept the credibility of outsiders, not of the man who 
dared to say something that he must have known would 
bring the wrath of the Indonesian Government on his head 
and place the Catholic Church in East Timor at great risk. 
dying on Atauro as we found out the next day, but not for the 
reasons he implied. 
Starting in the middle of last year the Indonesian army 
started bringing in families from the Los Palos area in eastern 
Timor who had relatives among hard core Fretilin fighters and 
supporters in the hills. As kinsmen, Fretilin guerrillas.could exact 
food and supplies from them. 
The theory is simple enough. Clan and tribal lines are as 
tightly drawn in East Timor as in Melanesia. Relatives of Fretilin 
fighters would have to help them if requested. Those not related 
to them would not. 
In all 806 families comprising 3,737 people were brought to 
Atauro after the military operations in eastern Timor in June, 
July and August. Families are now being sent back. 
Many hundreds did die on Atauro because of severe gastro-
enteritis. According to Dr. Willy of the Red Cross, previous mal-
nutrition had so lowered resistance, especially in the close con-
finement of huts, that many were susceptible to disease. This 
was a very different story from that of the bishop. 
When we visited the island with the Red Cross we found that 
the Government had erected avenues of houses, provided garden 
plots, running water, seed, medical supplies and first aid posts 
which the Red Cross had regularly monitored. 
"A very different story from that of the bishop" says 
Hastings, but he fails to mention what the bishop's "story" 
is, even though he says that he taped the 2-hour interview 
with him. Hastings' own evaluation about the cause of numerous 
deaths on Atauro reads as follows: The ICRC's own evaluation is in itself horrifying enough. 
" ... previous malnutrition" which had "so lowered resist-
There was a core of truth in his statement about hundreds ance ... that many were susceptible to disease." 
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Why must we accept the vision of "avenues of houses ... 
garden plots .. . and first aid posts" which the Red Cross 
"had regularly monitored" without hearing what the bishop 
and, incidentally the prisoners themselves, had to say? The 
Red Cross, prestigious and western, is presented as the ob-
jective source . The bishop, "a mixed-race man . .. affable if 
nervous ... and quite open in his condemnation of the 
Indonesians" according to Hastings, is not even worth 
quoting. 
The bishop's statements about famine and atrocities, 
too, were dismissed out of hand by Hastings because he, the 
bishop, had not himself visited the places he spoke about 
himself but "relied on his priests for information". Again 
Whitlam, Hastings, Red Cross and Catholic Relief Services 
officials who visited these places must be believed, not 
priests who live there constantly and who must have by far 
the best opportunity to monitor conditions regularly. But 
Hastings apparently made no attempt to interview these 
priests, or if he did, he is silent about what they said. Yet 
he himself admits later, in the very same article, that they 
"remain the conscience of the whole people". He may have 
discovered that they were as open in their condemnation of 
the Indonesians as the bishop, and therefore not to be con-
sidered suitably quotable sources in this "independent 
assessment" of the situation. 
LECTURER BANNED FROM UNIVERSITY 
Juwono Sudarsono, a lecturer in international relations at 
the Social Sciences Faculty of the University of Indonesia, 
Jakarta, has been indefinitely banned from lecturing. 
The ban was issued by Daud Joesoef, Minister of 
Education and Culture, not by the University's recently-
appointed Rector, Professor Nugroho Notosusanto . The 
ban made no attempt to explain the reason for this 
measure. The Rector only said that, had it been because of 
academic incompetence, he would have been the one to act. 
After making a number of enquiries, Juwono eventually 
discovered that he was being accused of saying, during a 
discussion at a closed meeting in the Atma Jaya University, 
Jakarta, that "Suharto's government is getting more and 
more rotten every day and I will work actively from within 
to hasten this process". 
In actual fact, as can be proven from the transcript of 
tapes made during the discussion, Juwono said no such 
thing. He did indeed talk about conditions under which a 
government might fall, but he was quoting Nixon, in his 
book The Real War. Nixon quotes a statement by Lenin 
that a government that has turned rotten does not need to 
be overthrown by a communist movement. "Such a govern-
ment will fall of its own accord, because of its own internal 
contradictions." (Source: Tempo, 30 January 1982) 
LATE NEWS 
E. Timor Assembly Members Signed Forged Document? 
In another article (SMH, 12 .3.1982), Hasting accused the 
E. Timor Assembly members who signed the June 1981 
Report to Suharto criticising Indonesian occupation forces 
of signing "a forgery". He and Whitlam had "a lengthy 
interview" with the two signatories, Mr. Isaac and Mr. 
Soares who, he says, told them "they signed the covering 
Jetter without knowing its purport or the contents of its 
enclosures". 
What he fails to report is that the two men had been in 
detention for six weeks and , whether he realised it, were 
still under restrictions. They could hardly have been 
meeting Whitlam as free agents and knew perfectly well 
what would happen to them if they stood by the Report. 
While discrediting the two Timorese, he nevertheless adds 
that "the accusations in the document are probably true . 
Certainly some of them are ." 
To claim, under such circumstances, that they signed a 
document without knowing the contents is a blatant 
example of journalism in the service of Indonesian interests. 
ABRI History Centre to which he was appointed in 1964. 
He has also presided over a special committee set up some 
years ago to standardise school text-books in history, 
civics and social services and bring them into line with the 
State ideology, Panca Sila. 
The students greeted their new Rector with a number of 
demands including the freedom to express opinions and 
the freedom to organise, and called for the appointment of 
teaching staff who understood the students' aspirations. 
The meeting addressed by the Rector was held on 23 
January, two days before the commencement of the new 
term . Had it been held later, there would have been far 
more students present, and the opposition to his appoint-
ment would certainly have been even more vociferously 
expressed. (Source : Tempo 23 January 1982) 
"DISRESPECTFUL" STUDENTS SUSPENDED 
Three students at the Pedagogy Institute in Jogjakarta have 
been suspended for two semesters for failing to show 
respect for President Suharto . This act of Iese majeste 
occurred when the three men failed to stand up as the 
President entered the hall where students were gathered to 
listen to an address by him. 
Their act of defiance was described by the Rector as 
"unbefitting students who are training to become teachers". 
Students Protest 
Students at the Institute have strongly protested against 
the suspensions and demanded the re-instatement of their 
"Don't Dirty Our Campus With Jack-Boots" is the slogan three colleagues. "If this statement fails to evoke a response 
that greeted Professor Nugroho Notosusanto, the newly- ... and undesirable excesses occur, this will not be the 
appointed Rector of the University of Indonesia, Jakarta responsibility of the Student Senate." 
when he arrived at the University to address a meeting of The Rector admitted there was no rule requiring people 
NEW U.I. RECTOR OPPOSED BY STUDENTS 
students soon after his appointment had been announced. to stand up when the President entered. It was simply a 
Professor Nugroho is the chief historian of the Armed matter of etiquette, he said. 
Forces (ABRI} and will retain his position as Head of the (Source : Tempo, 23 January 1982} 
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SIAUW GIOK TJHAN'S BOOK BANNED 
Siauw Giok Tjhan's book , Uma Jaman (Five Periods), was 
banned thrnughout Indonesia on January 20th 1982 by the 
Attorn ey General. The book , which is mainly about the · 
integration of the Chinese minority into the Indonesian 
community , was published in Holland last year , shortly 
be fo~e the author died . (See TAPOL Bulletin No . 48 p. 11.) 
Several Indonesian periodicals had given the book favour- · 
able reviews . 
Siauw was a leading activist in the struggle for indepen-
dence from the Dutch, and was a member of parliament 
during the Sukarno era. He spent 13 years in detention 
after Suharto seized power in the 1965 coup . After his 
release he continued to be concerned with human rights in 
Indonesia and the position of the Chinese community . 
In the banning order, the Attorney Genral, Ismail Saleh , 
who also recently banned the books of Pannoedya Ananta 
T oer, gave the reason as Siauw's "personal interpretation" 
of the 1948 Madiun affair and the 1965 coup. Saleh states 
that the book sought to incite ex-political prisoners of the 
GJOS movement and ex-members of Siauw's own banned 
organisation , BAPERKI (Consultative Association on Indo-
nesian Citizenship). 
The Attorney General ordered that anyone who is in 
possession of the book, whether for ownership, sale or 
distribution , should hand over the copies to the Public 
Prosecutor's Office . 
(Source : Sinar Harapan 22/ l /82) 
LURAH DISMISSED BECAUSE OF 
"OTs" AMONG VOTERS 
A village head (/urah) in the district of Cianjur, West Java 
has been dismissed because there were 3 2 "OT' persons 
(persons regarded as being ex-G30S/PKI)* on the electoral 
roll of the village when he was elected. 
Whether or not these persons voted for him, or indeed 
whether they took part in the election which was held in 
January 1979, seems to be beside the point. 
The moves to dismiss the lurah, Dadang Rukmana, 
started about a year after his election . Vigorous attempts 
were made by the villagers to oppose his dismissal, and 
delegations were sent to various state bodies right up to 
Parliament in Jakarta. It was only recently, after Dadang 
had been summoned to · transfer his post to the man 
appointed to succeed him , that the reason for his dismissal, 
namely the inclusion of "OT" people on the electoral roll, 
was made clear. 
(Source : Tempo, 27 February 1982) 
*OT stands for Organisasi Terlarang (prohibited organisa-
tion). It is now the designation being used in place of ET 
(ex-ta pol). For an explanation of the origin of "OT'', see 
T APOL Bulletin, No 49 , January 1982, p. 8 and p. 2, 
(editorial comment). 
Note: Democratically-elected luralzs are rapidly becoming a thing of 
the past, and are now being replaced by people appointed from 
above. The removal of this particular lurah may in addition be 
intended to intimidate or "punish" a village for having too many 
"ex-G30S/PKI elements" in its population. 
Th~ Golongan Put~h (White Group) anti-election symbol on display during the 1971 general election campaign. Go/put was a movement 
urgmg people to pierce the blank part of the voting slip, in protest against the elections. • 
Many group~ are currently declaring their intentions not to vote at all. Although they represent a variet)" of views and differ in their 
ways of expressing opposition, they are being referred to collectively as Go/put. 
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GUEST COLUMN 
THE GENERAL ELECTION: CHOSEN BEFORE BEING ELECTED 
In May this year, those Indonesians who are entitled to vote 
under present Indonesian law will elect their represent-
atives to the Peoples' Consultative Assembly (MPR) and the 
House of Representatives (DPR). The new MPR, some of 
whose members are elected and some appointed, will 
choose a President for the 1983- t 988 term of office. The 
President will then choose a Vice-President . 
Under the Indonesian system as regulated by General 
Suharto's regime, there are three political parties, the PDI 
(Indonesian Democratic Party), the PPP (United Develop-
ment Party), and GOLKAR (Functional Groups). These 
parties play a significant role in keeping the Suharto govern-
ment in power. 
Although the names and symbols of these three parties 
are very different from each other, the political ideology 
regulating the direction and nature of their activities is 
the same; the 1945 Constitution (UUD45) and the State 
Ideology (Pancasila). The similarity of their basic principles 
means that the members of the new MPR and DPR could in 
fact be appointed by the traditional Indonesian method of 
negotiation and discussion rather than going through the 
formality of a so-called general election. But since a general 
election is regarded as the way of showing that democracy 
exists in a society, the Suharto regime insists on holding 
elections in order to demonstrate that democracy is alive 
and well in Indonesia. 
Beneath the Garuda bird on the sacred Indonesian 
national emblem are written the words Bhineka Tunggu/ 
Ika which mean "Unity in Diversity". This motto is no 
guarantee that people who are entitled to vote automatical-
ly have equal rights to stand for election. Paragraph 6 of the 
Constitution states : "The President shall be a native (asli) 
Indonesian."* 
It is not necessary to summon Hitler from his grave or to 
invite the pro-apartheid South African Government to tell 
us about racial discrimination. It is a legal fact that racism 
holds a position of great honour in the Indonesian state. 
Referring to the forthcoming election, General Suharto 
speaking as Head of State, categorically stated in his presi-
dential address on 17 August 1981 that although the 
Armed Forces (ABRI) would not take part in the elections, 
they would be given a third of the seats in the MPR, and 
100 of the 460 seats in the DPR. According to Suharto, 
ABRI's role in these bodies is as "stabiliser" and "dyn-
amiser" in implementation of their legislative task and to 
control the primary functions of Parliament for the 
"smooth and proper" enactment of laws.1 
According to Jakarta press reports GOLKAR is expected 
to win 80 per cent of the votes.2 GOLKAR has also pro-
posed that General Suharto should serve another term of 
office as president for the period of 1983-1988. On the 
matter of Vice-President, the leader of GOLKAR, Amir 
Murtono said: "The Vice-President must be able to sleep 
Hendrik Amahorseja 
on the same pillow as the President." 3 One Moslem group , 
Pembina Iman Tantrid Islam , has suggested that the MPR 
should appoint Mrs Tien Suharto as Vice-President.4 
GOLKAR's proposal that Suharto should be President 
has received strong support . Those in power, that is to say 
his close associates in Jakarta as well as overseas, support 
his efforts to implement the Five Year "Impoverishment" 
Plan (PELITA).5 All that has been achieved with this plan 
is that 51 per cent of the Indonesian population live below 
the poverty line. 
In international circles he is supported in particular by 
the member states of the IGGI (Inter-Governmental Group 
on Indonesia). Thanks to General Suharto's authority, 
Japan had invested US $34,490,000,000 in Indonesia by 
1980.6 The main source of Indonesia's revenue is oil and 
natural gas. Of the 16 companies extracting oil and gas in 
Indonesia, 11 are US-owned . Not long ago, the US Vice-
President George Bush said in Manila that US policies pre-
ferred "authoritarian" to "totalitarian" governments, after 
a somewhat cynical remark about "loving your democratic 
processes" . 7 This is not surprising since the USA intends to 
increase military aid to Indonesia and other ASEAN 
countries.8 
Neither is it strange that there is general agreement that 
Suharto will continue as Head of State for a fourth term 
(1982-1988) since one-third of the seats in the MPR are 
occupied by ABRI and the remainder monopolised by 
GOLKAR, the largest political party. 
Although the positions of Suharto and the members of 
the MPR and DPR have already been determined in advance 
of the election farce on 4th May, it should be understood 
that if something happens suddenly and someone else is 
crowned instead of Suharto, a change of personnel without 
a change in the social, political and economic system is no 
guarantee that the Indonesian people will be any better off, 
particularly the 51 per cent who live below the poverty 
level. Poverty, oppression, exploitation of natural resources, 
and racial discrimination will continue. Basic human rights 
in Indonesia can only be fully realised in everyday life by 
striving for them by other means than the farce of a general 
election. 
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T APOL Bulletin No . SO March 1982 21 
A PROFILE OF ALI MURTOPO (1924-) 
The Minister fo r Inform ation is one of Suharto's oldest and 
closest associates. Through his policies and practics, Ali has 
become the most ruthl ess and influential figure in deter-
mining the sha pe and methods of the Suharto regime . The 
following account covers some aspects of Ali's career. 
Military : Ali Murtopo fought against the Dutch . Towards 
the end of the Japanese occupation he joined the Japanese-
sponsored Hisbullah . Following the defeat of the ! apanese 
he joined the Indonesian regular army . In 1952 Alt became 
a company commander in the Diponegoro (Suharto's) 
Central Java command, leading the elite Banteng Raiders. 
It was at this time that his close association with Suharto 
began. In 19 5 7 he was director of Diponegoro 's "political 
affairs " branch , the beginning of a long career in "intelli-
gence " . In 1960 Ali joined Suharto in Jakarta , when 
Suharto was deputy chief-of-staff at army headquarters. 
Ali's intelligence work intensified in 1962 when he 
commanded a "combat-intelligence " unit , working on 
Sukarno's West Irian campaign from Dobo Island. This unit 
was the beginning of Ali's major p·ower base for many years 
- OPSUS (Special Operations). Ali's work on West Irian did 
not end there. In 1969 Ali , through OPSUS, supervised 
the travesty of the "Act of Free Choice' ', following which 
West Irian was incorporated into Indonesia against the 
wishes of West Papuans. 
Intelligence : In 1963 Ali joined Suharto in KOSTRAD (the 
elite Strategic Command). From this base he consolidated 
OPSUS with a "defensive and active {policy) directed 
towards securing and protecting the national efforts by 
eliminating all kinds of threats, challenges and obstacles." 
From OPSUS, Ali gathered around himself a group of 
Chinese intellectuals and financiers, in particular a powerful 
Catholic group, including Liem Bian Kie (Jusuf Wanandi), 
Liem Bian Koen and Harry Tjan. 
OPSUS was lavishly funded by 'State' enterprises, 
including the oil company, Pertamina, and forestry con-
cessions in Kalimantan. In 1976 Ali's network was hard hit 
by the collapse of the Pertamina empire some months 
earlier. However, shortly afterwards Ali managed to place 
his man, Brigadier-General Abdurachman Ramly, as head 
of the large 'State' tin enterprise PT Timah. Later 
when OPSUS was formally dissolved its vast business 
empire remained intact. 
After 1968 OPSUS was particularly concerned with 
'intelligence ' . Rubber and other commodities were smuggled 
across the Strait s of Malacca, and Ali was widely known as 
Indonesia 's biggest smuggling operator. 
Sabotage : In 1964, OPS US, headed by Ali , . subv~rted 
Sukarno's nationalist Confrontation with Malaysia. Ah was 
smuggled into Malaysia in September-October 1964 ~or 
secret negotiations with senior British and Malaysian 
officials. 
Coup-making: Ali 's activities immediately after the 1965 
Coup were crucial to the installation of Suharto. He 
supplied army intelligence and backing in organizing large 
demonstrations of anti-Sukarno students. When the student 
organization KAMI was disbanded by Sukarno in Febr_u~ry 
1966 the students used OPSUS as the base for organizing 
its demonstrations. Ali also visited pro-western Asian 
countries to arrange funding for the new regime. His 
contacts in Singapore, Taiwan and Hong Kong and with 
domestic financiers have provided the major financial 
support to the Suharto regime. On his return from fund-
raising Ali was busy in Central Java supervising the 
hounding and 'purging' of pro-Sukarno members of the 
army. From February 1966, Ali was foremost in urging 
Suharto to dislodge Sukarno. 
Suharto's 'security'-related operations, for example, Provocation: By 1973 Ali's pro-Japanese stance had led to 
keeping an eye on party activities, and on workers. In conflict between different Indonesian factions. His main 
1970-71 Ali successfully used OPSUS to break up party challenge was from General Sumitro, then Commander of 
politics and replace this with Suharto 's election vehicle KOPKAMTIB. Rivalry reached its peak during the visit of 
GOLKAR. In 1971 Ali's "floating mass" doctrine which the Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka in mid-January 1974. 
banned political activities at village level was announced by During large-scale rioting, 11 people were killed and there 
Brigadier-General Widodo. was widespread damage. It later emerged that the riots had 
During the late 1960s Ali used his OPSUS network to been provoked by Ali in a successful attempt to discredit 
support the US in Indochina. In October 1969 an ~-PSUS- and unseat Sumitro. Following the riots Sumitro was 
backed resolution in Parliament called for recogruhon of dismissed from his command of KOPKAMTIB and 'resigned' 
Saigon. Ali strongly supported the Lon Nol coup in Cam- as deputy commander of the Armed Forces. In trials which 
bodia. Meanwhile Ali's emissaries fostered American followed the riots, Ali also attempted to discredit the pro-
contacts in 'trade' missions to Saigon. Ali's other domestic American "technocrats", who opposed his pro-Japanese 
intelligence operations also included CSIS (Centre for endeavours. In this he was partially successful. Meanwhile 
Strategic and International Studies) and BAKIN (Central he kept his OPSUS, BAKIN and GOLKAR networks, pre-
Intelligence Body). serving intact his considerable power base. His old 
Smuggling: Before the 1965 Coup, OPSUS operations were smuggling colleague Admiral Sudomo became head of 
funded by a large smuggling operation, under cover of KOPKAMTIB. 
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NEW ~ECUKITY CORPS : 
PROTECTION AGAINST CRIME OR PROTECTION RACKET? 
A new "security corps", run as a private company, is being 
set up in Indonesia. The corps which has been given the 
attractive-sounding Sanskrit name Baladhika Karya (Troops 
of Service), is the recreation of a corps set up in 1963 by 
SOKSI, the Karyawan organisation , the predecessor of 
GOLKAR (Functional Groups), the Army-backed party . 
The chief promoter of this corps is General Suhardiman, 
formerly chairman of SOKSI. He announced that Major-
General Acub Zaenal is to become commander . (Major-
General Zaenal has served both as military commander and 
governor of West Irian. He was removed as Governor two 
years ago amid reports of his involvement in high-level 
corruption.) 
The corps will be composed of retired soldiers , ex-
convicts and members of street-gangs or school drop-outs. 
(Street-gang youths known in Central Java as gali-gali, were 
very active during the anti-Chinese street violence that 
erupted in Central Java in November 1980). 
Suhardiman said in December that plans to train recruits 
for this security company would commence in January this 
year. It is intended to have one thousand "core" members 
and five thousand "activists" in each province. If these 
plans are implemented in all 27 provinces, the corps will 
have a total membership of 162,000. 
Reporting the establishment of this corps, Tempo (2 
January 1982) said some people feared this "security" 
corps would develop into an organised mafia. "That must 
not be allowed to happen" responded Suhardiman. 60 per 
cent of the company's shares would be held by SOKSI, he 
said, adding, in an attempt to reassure critics: "SOKSI is 
hardly likely to wage rebellion." As further reassurance of 
the "responsible" attitude this corps would adopt, Suhardi-
man said that the Chief-of-Police would be asked to become 
its Patron, while Co-ordinating Minister, General Surono 
and Inspector-General for Development, Major-General 
Sudjomo Humardani would be its advisors. 
Continued from opposite page 
Annexation: Apart from his role in the annexation of West 
Papua, Ali was also the 'mastermind' behind the violent and 
bloody annexation of East Timor. His campaign began as 
early as May 1974, one month after the overthrow of the 
Caetano government in Lisbon, with a recommendation 
in parliament that East Timar "return" to Indonesian 
control. tater, his full-fledged Operation Komodo included 
infiltration, propaganda and psychological warfare in East 
Timor, leading to the civil war in August 1975. Ali's 
emissaries were sent all over the world, to confer with the 
US, Australia and Portugal , and fo make clear Indonesia's 
intention to annex the former Portuguese colony. Regular 
border incursions by Indonesian troops began in September 
1975. On December 7th 1975 a full-scale invasion by 
Indonesian troops saw the end of Operation Komodo, and 
the beginning of the campaign of mass murder which has 
led to the deaths of up to 200,000 East Timorese. 
Propaganda: Through his intelligence activities Ali was in a 
strong position to manipulate the Indonesian press from the 
inception of the Suharto regime. In 1971 Ali gained control 
of the PWI (Indonesian Journalists' Association) through 
rigged elections. From here he imposed his brand of 'con-
sensual' journalism. Immediately afterwards two new dailies 
One of the main tasks of Baladhika Kary a will be to 
provide well-trained and highly-disciplined "security" 
guards to protect businesses, shops , banks and hotels 
against crime which is said to be on the increase in many 
parts of the country. 
Although Suhardiman has announced that " BK" re-
cruits will be trained at Police training centres, the Chief-of-
Police , Police General Awaloedin sounded somewhat less 
enthusiastic about this new security venture . "Things are 
pretty bad" , he said , "if we expect ex-convicts to guard 
jewellery shops ." 
Whether or not formal approval from the Police and the 
government has been granted, it seems that the first training 
course for 100 " BK" recruits already took place in Jakarta 
in January. 
KOPKAMTIB to Ann Local Government Officers 
Not to be outdone by this private initiative on the "secur-
ity" front , Admiral Sudomo, Commander of KOPKAMTIB 
announced a week later (Tempo, 9 January 1982) that local 
government officers in charge of kampung administration 
(RT/RW) in Jakarta would soon be arrested, as a measure 
to fight crime. There were also plans to arm members of 
Hansip, the Civil Guard. 
In an effort to reassure the public, Sudomo said that 
arms would be issued indiscriminately but only to those 
RT/RW officers already trained in the use of weapons, 
namely retired or non-active soldiers. 
There was a sharp increase in the level of crime in 
Jakarta in 1981 despite the Clean-Sweep Operation 
(Operasi Sapujagat) launched a year ago (see TAPOL 
Bulletin No . 41/42, September-November 1981). In fact , as 
some critics of the new plans have pointed out, one of the 
objectives of Operasi Sapujagat was to reduce the number 
of weapons being held in the community ; now, KOPKAM-
TIB is doing precisely the reverse. 
emerged, GOLKAR's Suara Karya and OPSUS' Berita 
Yudha, both directly under the control of Ali Murtopo. 
Later as Minister of Information Ali's control was extended 
with the power to ban any newspaper or article which does 
not adhere to Ali's line on any subject. 
Now, apparently in ill-health, Ali is not as prominent as 
before. However the effects of his influence remain un-
impaired , and several of his younger and fitter associates 
still diligently carry out his policies. 
In the current battle to be chosen as Indonesia's Vice-
President to serve during Suharto's next 5-year term (I 983-
1988), Ali Murtopo is reportedly fighting hard to force 
Suharto to keep a pledge made long ago to select Ali as his 
successor. (The battle for the position of Vice-President has 
assumed significance because the opinion is gaining ground 
among Suharto's supporters that Suharto may not complete 
his next term.) One of his first moves to win this position 
was to propose that Suharto be named "Father of Develop-
ment' ', a proposal that has predictably been supported by 
numerous groups and individuals. 
Ali Murtopo has left a very deep mark on Indonesian 
politics and society-to say nothing of West Papua and East 
Tim or. 
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